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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the Third District Juvenile 
Court, in and for Summit County, State of Utah, to the Utah Court 
of Appeals, and is authorized pursuant to 78-2a-3(2)(c), Utah Code 
Annotated as amended in 1990, and is consolidated with the 
underlying domestic relations action filed in the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
and is authorized pursuant to 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated 
as amended in 1990. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Has Plaintiff/Appellee caused the lower Court to 
blatantly violate this Court's mandate. The Standard of review 
is a question of law, and is reviewed for correctness with no 
diference to the lower Courtfs determination. Berube vs. Fashion 
Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989). 
2. Do many of the FINDINGS constitute a mere "parade 
of horribles11 that have no bearing whatsoever on whether the 
Father destroyed a relationship with his son. The standard of 
review is a question of law, and is reviewed for correctness with 
no deference to the lower Court's determination. Berube vs. Fashion 
Centre Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 ( Utah 1989 ). 
3. Had the lower Court followed the instructions 
regarding appropriate FINDING OF FACT, it could not have come 
to the conclusion that the Feather had abandoned his child. The 
standard of review is a question of law, and is reviewed for 
correctness with no deference to the lower Court's determination. 
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with an attorney who explained tc her that there had to be a full 
year with no contact with the Father before she could have his 
rights terminated. She cut off the visitation rights altogether, 
and the Father then Petitioned the District Court for specific 
visitation. She responds with a termination proceeding, which 
is assigned to the Juvenile Court for determination. This 
determination was later adopted by the District Court, and an 
appeal was made to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
On December 9, 1991, this Court reversed and remanded 
the matter to the trial Court with instructions tc make more 
detailed findings, and to redetermine the question of whether 
the Father ha.d abandoned the Child, and stated specifically 
"We do not intend our remand to be merely an exercise in bolstering 
and supporting the conclusion already reached." 
Notwithstanding this directive, the lower Court did 
exactly tha.t, and restated the Proposed Amended Findings submitted 
by the Appellee to bolster and support the conclusion already 
reached. 
From this resubmission of FINDINGS tne Appellant once 
again appeals, with a request that this time the Court reverse 
and remand with instructions to set out meaningful visitation 
with the minor child. 
DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT 
The Juvenile Court, Honorable Olof A. Johansson, 
terminated all of the parental rights of the Appellant, and 
the District Court has adopted the Juvenile Court's determination. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant respectfully submits that the lower Court 
has ignored this Court's specific instruction not to bolster 
and support the conclusion already reached. 
Appellant submits that a good man}' of the FINDINGS, go 
only to make the Appellant out as a "bad guy" and haive nothing 
to do with the critical questions of fact that must be addressed. 
The lower Court merely adopted, essentially verbatim, the 
proposed amended findings submitted by the Appellee, and did so, 
so long after the trial, that the lower Court perhaps, did not 
recall the specific instructions mandated by this Court. 
In addition the lower Court did not address the specific 
issues that this Court mandated and left a good many wholly 
unconsidered in the said FINDINGS, under a pretense that only the 
Mother's testimony should be considered, because only the lower Court 
can test the demeanor of the witness, etc. 
Lastly, there is no basis at all, either in the evidence 
or as to any FINDINGS, establishing that the Father destroyed the 
relationship of parent-child. 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court once again 
reverse, and once again remand, but this time with instructions to 
set out a meaningful visitation schedule for the Father. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Kim Woodward (hereinafter the Mother) and Richard 
Cameron Fazzio (hereinafter the Father) met in 1985, and 
began living together as husband and wife in August, 1985. 
(T. 94). In February, 1986, the Mother first learned that 
she was pregnant with R.A.F. (hereinafter the Child). (T.95). 
The Child was born on September 17, 1986, and the 
parties got married approximately three months later, 
November 3, 1986. (T. 19) At the very time that the Mother 
married the Father herein, she was married to Darren Holt, 
and so the Court, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, annulled 
the marriage between the Mother and Father after about one year of 
marriage, ie: November 19, 1987. (T. 19) 
The Decree of Annulment provided for the Mother to have 
custody of the subject Child, and the Father would have reasonable 
visitation "as the parties can agree." (T. 119). 
After the Decree of Annulment was entered, up to and 
including the time of trial, the Mother had moved in with her 
own mother, and then moved to Springville, then moved to Riverton, 
then moved to West Jordan, and then moved back to Coalville. 
(T-119.) At no time did the Mother provide the Father or his 
parents with her address or phone number. (T-120). 
The Father testified that he had continuous contact 
with the Child, and saw the Child very regularly, except for 
the time that he could not find the Mother. (T-522). 
The Father petitioned the District Court for specific 
visitation, (T-544), after the Mother had met with an attorney 
who informed her that the Father has to go a whole year without 
any contact with the Child before the Mother could have the 
Child declared legally abandoned. (T-81). The Mother had cut 
off all contact between the Father and his parents with the 
minor Child. (T-81). 
The Fatherfs Petition for specific visitation, in 
the District COurt was answered with a Petition to Terminate 
the Parental Rights of the Father, and a Motion to Transfer 
the same to the Juvenile Court. The Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson granted the request to have the Petition to Terminate 
Parental Rights heard by the Juvenile Court, and provided for 
the Father to have one visit a month until further order of 
the Court. 
The Father testified that he saw the minor Child every 
time that he was allowed, except one time when in jail, and 
another time when he traveled from Las Vegas, Nevada, to 
Coalville, both on a Saturday and a Sunday, but -the Mother 
was no where to be found. (T-300). 
The Petition to Terminate the Father's interests in 
the Child was heard by the Honorable Olof Johansson, in the 
Third District Juvenile Court, Summit County, State of Utah, 
on August 16, August 17, and August 29, 1990, and the Court 
then in November, 1990, entered its ruling that the Father's 
conduct has led to a destruction of the parent/child relation-
ship, and therefore the Child had been legally abandoned by 
his Father. 
The Appellant then appealed the determination of the 
Third District Juvenile Court in and for Summit County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable Olof Johansson Presiding in Court 
of Appeals No. 900626 CA, and also the adoption of the determination 
by the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
Presiding, in Court of Appeals No. 910136-CA which was 
consolidated into the single appeal under Court of Appeals 
No. 900626-CA. 
This Court had the matters fully briefed and argued 
and then submitted, and then made its Opinion of December 9, 
1991, wherein this Court stated: "We reverse and remand for 
more detailed findings." 
Factually it is important to note that this Court 
reversed the determination made by the Juvenile Court, as this 
Court stated in its last paragraph: 
"We do not intend our remand to be merely an exercise 
in bolstering and supporting the conclusion already 
reached." Allred vs. Allred, 797 P. 2d 1108, 1112 
(Utah, 1990J"; This ciourt is not altogether confident 
that the trial court's final decision was correct, 
particularly since the action to terminate Fazzio's 
parental rights was commenced by Woodward in response 
to Fazzio's petition for specific visitation. The 
timely assertion of such a petition by Fazzio is 
hardly the conduct of a disinterested parent, 
(emphasis orginal) 
On or about January 24, 1992, the Honorable Olof A. 
Johansson, Judge invited both parties to submit proposed 
Findings, as noted on Exhibit A, attached hereto: 
The Court has received a remand of the above case 
for more specific factual findings as it relates to 
paragraphs 7, 8, 10 and 11 of this Court's findings. 
I, therefore, invite you, but you are not required, 
to submit proposed written findings consistent with 
the request of the Court of Appeals, (emphasis added) 
Such findings should be provided to this Cdurt 
no later than February 28, 1992. If additional time 
is necessary, please advise. 
Each of the parties then submitted proposed FINDINGS, 
along with their respective Briefs, for the benefit of the 
lower Court. 
Counsel for the Mother submitted his set of Proposed 
Additional Findings of Fact, on or about February 28, 1992, 
as reflected as Exhibit B, attached hereto. 
However, instead of following the instructions of 
the Utah Court of Appeals mandate not to engage in f,an exercise 
in bolstering and supporting the conclusion already reached." 
Counsel for the Mother submited his Proposed Findings to do 
the exact opposite, and then submits the following at the end 
of the same in order to make the entire appeal a matter of 
demeanor on the stand, and hence overlooking all that the Father 
had to say, all that the Paternal Grandmother had to say, ana 
all that the Paternal Grandfather had to say: 
"CONCLUSION" 
While two of the three Judges on the Court of Appeals 
hearing the instant matter on appeal, seemed concerned 
about this Court's final decision, it is Petitioner's 
belief that if the Court provides the Findings of Fact, 
clearly supported by the record, which have been propos 
in the instant document, the Court of Appeals will have 
a better understanding as to the nature of this case 
and the reasons for this Court's decision. 
As Petitioner argued in her brief on appeal: 
"Never has a case more clearly demonstrated 
why it is essential for an appellate court to 
defer to the juvenile court on findings of 
fact than the instant case. It is the position 
of the Appellee (Petitioner) that Appellant 
(Respondent) stated numerous falsehoods and 
committed perjury during his testimony in the 
trial court. This was demonstrated through cross-
examination, rebuttal witnesses and evidence which 
could not be overcome by Appellant (Respondent). 
Futhermore, Appellee (Petitioner) maintains that 
the physical manner in which the Appellant 
(Respondent) and his witnesses testified in this 
case was as important as the words they used 
in determining their credibility. The trial judge 
alone was in a position to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses and his determination should 
not be disturbed by this Court without a demon-
stration by Appellant (Respondent) that the 
Findings are against the weight of the evidence 
and thus clearly erroneous. State in Interest of 
P.K. and M.H. vs. Harrison, 783 P. 2d 565, 570 
(Utah App. 1989.)" 
Petitioner/Appellee's Brief at 21. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of February, 1992 
/s/ 
LARRY R. KELLER 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
Thereafter, on or about April 30, 1992, the Honorable 
Olof A. Johansson, Judge sent the letter attached hereto as 
Exhibit C , which states: 
Do not give up hope. I am making serious attempts 
at providing more detailed findings in the above 
case, in between my regular caseload. 
Each of your briefs are extremely well done and 
very helpful. I thank you for them. 
Finally, the Honorable Olof A. Johansson, Judge, 
submitted his AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT, on June 15, 1992, 
some six months after the directive from the Court of Appeals, 
and the express mandate not to engage in "an exercise in bolstering 
and supporting the conclusion already reached." 
A copy of the said AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT, are 
attached hereto, as Exhibit D , so that this Court can see 
the almost verbatim duplication of Mr. Keller's PROPOSED 
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT, as if the lower Court considered 
matter for six months and then blindly copied the PROPOSED 
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT, in an obvious effort to make 
the entire trial a matter of demeanor on the stand, so that 
only the trial judge can have a clue as to what the evidence 
is . 
From this bold "exercise in bolstering and supporting 
the conclusion already reached,ff the Appellant once again 
appeals. 
EVENTS AT A GLANCE 
May 24, 1985 Cameron and Kim meet for the first time (T-94) 
August, 1985 Cameron and Kim begin living together (T-94) 
February, 1986 Kim learns shefspregnant with R.A.F. (T-94) 
September 17, 1986 - R.A.F is born (T-96) 
November 3, 1986 - Kim and Cameron get married (T-96) 
September, 1987 - Kim and Cameron seperated (T-96) 
November 19, 1987 - Marriage Annulled - (T-96) 
November, 1987 - July, 1989 - Kim moved to mother's, then her 
own apartment, to Coalville, to Springville, to 
Riverton, to West Jordan, to Coalville (T-119) 
1987 - 1988 - Father has visitation as parties can agree (T-74) 
October 1988 - July 1989 - Visitation via Grandparents (T82,104,105) 
March 25, 1988 - Kim marries Third Husband - Mark Woodward (T-83) 
October 1988 - Kim consults attorney about cutting Father off (T-81) 
October 1989 - Kim terminates contact altogether with R.A.F. (T-Z74) 
October 1989 - Father Petitions for Specific visitation 
January 1990 - Mother petitions to terminate parental rights 
August 1990 - Trial on termination issue 
November 1990 - FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS and ORDER 
December 1990 - Appeal to Court of Appeals 
December 1991 - Court of Appeals - reverse and remand 
June, 1992 - Amended FINDINGS submitted 
July, 1992 - Notice of Appeal filed 
August, 1992 - Petition for Writ of Mandamus 
September, 1992 - Petition for Writ of Mandamus denied 
ARGUMENT NO. ONE 
PLAINTIFF HAS CAUSED THE LOWER COURT TO BLATANTLY 
VIOLATE THIS COURT'S MANDATE. 
When this matter was before this Court in the prior 
Appeal, this Court made the reverse and remand with perfectly 
clear instructions. 
As noted on page 479 of the Opinion, this Court not 
only stated in unequivocal terms, that the reverse and remand 
was not to be "merely an exercise in bolstering and supporting 
the conclusion already reached " this Court refered to a 1990 
case, on what was to be completed and why. 
In the case of Allred vs. Allred, cited by the Court, 
which is found at 797 P. 2d 1108, (Utah App. 1990), the Court 
of Appeals was considering a situation where the lower court 
had set child support at $100.00 per month for the month, 
without making appropriate findings of fact to support the 
same. 
The Appellate Court was trying to determine how the 
lower Court arrived at the determination, and after a thorough 
review of the record on appeal, the Court concluded both that 
the determination was incorrect as well as the fact that there 
was no connection between the evidence and the findings reached 
by the trial court. 
Hence, the Couit reversed the determination because it 
was an incorrect determination, and then remanded the (Same . 
to follow specific instructions on how to arrive at the correct 
determination. 
This is exactly what this Court has done in the case 
at bar. 
This Court stated that the determination that the 
father had abandoned was not supported by the evidence, when 
considering only one bit of evidence, ie: the timely assertion 
of a petition to determine his specific visitation. Note 
on page 479of the Opinion: 
This Court is not altogether confident that the 
trial court's final decision was correct, particularly 
since the action to terminate Fazzio's parental rights 
was commenced by Woodward in response to Fazzio's 
petition for specific visitation. The timely assertion 
of such a petition by Fazzio is hardly the conduct of 
a disinterested parent. (emphasis original) 
Not only did the Court of Appeals, make it abundantly 
clear that the determination was incorrect when considering 
only one factor alone, the Court of Appeals made very specific 
instructions on what was to be consiaered in the determination 
of the abandonment issue. 
On page 478 of the Opinion, this Court instructs the 
lower court on what is to be in the Findings: 
The trial court's findings of fact should resolve 
these conflicts unequivocally, by stating the specific 
subsidiary facts as the trial court found them. The 
findings should set forth, with as much precision as 
possible, the number of times Fazzio visited the child 
during particular periods; the length of each of the 
visits; the number of visits Woodward intentionally 
prevented; the sums Fazzio provided as child support, 
either personally or through his parents; the number 
and type of gifts Fazzio gave to the child and the 
occasions on which he gave them; and the specific 
statements, acts, or omissions that demonstrate 
Fazzio's intent to either accept or disregard his 
oblgations as a parent (e;g;, instances of appellant 
performing child care functions like changing his 
diaper or feeding him, denying that the child was 
his responsibility, etc.,). 
Further,the findings should explicitly address the 
impact Woodward's frequent relocation had on Fazzio's 
ability to maintain contact with the child, the 
effect Fazzio's living and working outside of Utah 
had on his visitation, the manner and effect of any 
refusal on Fazzio's part to legally acknowledge 
his paternity, and any other factors bearing on 
whether Fazzio consciously disregarded the child to 
such an extent that the parent-child relationship 
was destroyed. 
Appellant respectfully submits that instead of addressing 
the Findings of Fact, showing the specific detail and hox* the 
ultimate conclusion was reached by the lower Court, as instructed 
by the Appellate Court, the lower Court merely adopted 
the PROPOSED ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT proposed by the 
Mother's Counsel, making the clear directions of this Court a 
mockery, as if every bit of evidence in the lower Court that 
supports the notion that the Father had not abandoned the child, 
is a matter of credibility, where only the trial judge can see 
things mysteriously unknown to the Appellate Court, because 
the Appellate Court only has the hard, cold record. 
Hence, any testimony that the Father may have on the issue 
is to be wholly and completely disregarded because only the 
trial court can test the demeanor of the witness and determine 
issues of credibility, etc. 
Hence, any testimony that the Paternal Grandmother 
may have on the issue is to be wholly and completely disregarded 
because only the trial court can test the demeanor of the witness 
and determine issues of credibility, etc. 
Hence, any testimony that the Paternal Grandfather 
may have on the issue is to be wholly and completely disregarded 
because only the trial court can test the demeanor of the 
witness and determine the issue of credibility, etc. 
Appellant submits that what is even more significant, is 
the notion that the lower court can wholly and completely 
disregard all of the toys, and gifts and articles of clothing 
produced in open court, showing what was supplied by the Father 
for the child, as well as all of the many pictures, some of 
which were blown-up, of the times the Father spent with the 
Child, and lastly the tape recordings of the minor child's 
own voice, regarding the Father. 
Surely one can not argue that the toys, gifts, 
clothing, pictures, tapes, etc., are of such a nature that only 
the trial judge can determine their demeanor and credibility 
on the witness stand. 
Notwithstanding, under the guise of a demeanor 
argument the lower Court totally disregarded the same as non-
existant. 
Appellant respectfully submits that this Court reverse 
the lower Court once again, but this time with instructions 
to set out a meaningful visitation schedule for the father. 
ARGUMENT NO. TWO 
MANY FINDINGS CONSTITUTE A MERE "PARADE OF HORRIBLES" 
THAT HAS NO BEARING WHATSOEVER ON WHETHER THE FATHER 
DESTROYED A RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS SON. 
Appellant respectfully submits that at the time of 
trial Counsel objected to the admisability of certain evidence 
as having no relevance whatsoever, and was merely submitted 
to make the Appellant out as a bad guy. 
Now, the lower Court has endorsed the same, as somehow 
relevant to whether a Father destroyed a relationship with his 
son, showing just how much the lower Court was mislead. 
Appellant submits that the following have absolutely 
no bearing whatsoever on the question: 
Finding 7(a) states: Respondent admitted that he 
urged Petitioner to get an abortion when he" first 
learned she was pregnant with R.A.F. Respondent urged 
Petitioner to get an abortion on more than one 
occasion. 
Finding 7(e) states: On one occasion, Respondent 
grabbed Petitioner by the hair and had her on the 
floor and was beating her head into the floor when 
she started calling for Christopher (her son from 
a prior marriage) to run over to the neighbors and 
have them call the police. As soon as he moved, 
Respondent said ff(I)f anybody moves off that couch, 
I111 kill her.M R.A.F was one of the two children 
present on the couch observing this physical 
abuse to his mother and the threat to kill her. 
Both R.A.F and Christopher were terrified and they 
were taken by the police to the YWCA after this 
incident. 
Finding 11(a) states: Petitioner had a child from 
a previous marriage, Darren Christopher Holt (DOB 
2/13/83), who lived with the Petitioner at the* time 
she was married to Respondent. Christopher was 
approximately four years old during that period. 
Finding 11(b) states: During the course of the marriage, 
Petitioner and her children, including R.A.F, were 
regularly subjected to mental and physical threats 
and abuse by Respondent. 
Finding 11(c) states: Respondent admitted during 
the course of the marriage that he "smacked Kim" and 
that he did not make sure either R.A.F., or the child 
Christopher were out of the room when he slapped her. 
Finding 11(d) states: Petitioner talked Respondent 
into seeking marriage counseling during the marriage 
but not only did his abuse of her not change, Respondent 
actually beat her the day of the counseling because 
he didn't like the things she said to the counselor; 
Finding 11(e) states: Darren Holt testified that his 
son, Christopher, told him during his visitations that 
he was terrified of Respondent, and that Respondent 
had threatened him (Christopher) with a knife and hit 
him a number of times. Mr. Holt also testified Christopher 
told him Respondent at one point drove Petitioner 
and Christopher out of the Petitioner's home with a 
gun and told them that if they came back, he (Respondent) 
would kill them. This testimony was corroborated by 
Petitioner; 
Finding 11(f) states: When Mr. Holt confronted Respondent 
about this abuse of his son, Christopher, Respondent 
replied: " . . . While Christopher is in my house, I 
will treat him the way I want." This testimony was 
corroborated by Petitioner who described respondent's 
attitude toward Christopher as "mean and hateful ... 
. . . cruel " 
Finding 11(g) states: On one occasion, Respondent 
grabbed Petitioner by the hair and had her on the floor 
and was beating her head onto the floor when she started 
calling for Christopher to run over to the neighbors 
and have them call the police. Petitioner testified 
that as Christopher moved, Respondent said "(I)f 
anybody moves off that couch I'll kill her." 
R.A.F. was one of the two children present on the 
couch observing this physical, abuse of his mother 
and the threat to kill her. Both R.A.F. and Christopher 
were terrified and they were taken by the police 
to the YWCA after the incident. 
As to the finding #7(a), Appellant submits the Child 
surely would have no knowledge of abortion unless his Mother 
spent hours and hours with pictures and graphics, etc., and 
even to this day would be too young to relate with the same. 
As noted by the Court in its Opinion at page 477, 
The Wulffenstein test for determining abandonment in 
termination proceedings requires proof of two elements. 
First, the party seeking termination must prove the 
"the parent's conduct evidenced a conscious disregard 
for his or her parental obligations11 to the child. 
Tiinperly, 750 P. 2d at 1236. Second, the party 
must demonstrate that thelfdisregard led to the 
destruction of the parent-child relationship." Id., 
Wulffenstein, 560 P. 2d at 334. Both of these 
elements must be proven by clear and convincing 
evidence. See Santosky vs. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 
769 (1982); In re J. Children, 664 P. 2d 1158, 1159 
(Utah 1983). 
Appellant submits that his finding regarding the Father 
urging the Mother to get an abortion "on more than one occasion" 
only bears out the Appellant prior argument that the lower 
Court blindly rubberstamped the parade of horribles that the 
Mother's Counsel submitted in his PROPOSED ADDITIONAL FINDINGS 
As to Finding 7(e) one would assume that this would 
be very significant in references to the issues before this 
Court, until one learned that the child was eleven months old 
at most when this incident allegedly occurred. The child could 
not talk, and could not run for help, because he was so young 
he could not even stand. Note the transcript at page 30, with 
the Mother herself testifying that the Child was only eleven 
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Appellant submits that this again can not possibly 
bear on "the parent's conduct evidences a conscious disregard 
for his or her parental obligations to the child and that 
disregard led to the destruction of the parent-child 
relationship.ff 
This is evidence however, Appellant submits, that 
the lower Court blindly rubber stamped the PROPOSED ADDITIONAL 
FINDINGS OF FACT, submitted by the Mother's counsel. 
Appellant respectfully submits that essentially all 
of Finding #11, further confirms the notion that the lower 
Court blindly rubber stamped the PROPOSED ADDITIONAL FINDINGS 
OF FACT, submitted by the Mother's Counsel. 
There can be no question that Counsel submitted his 
"parade of horribles" regarding the Father, and the lower Court 
endorsed the whole of the same as the basis for abandonment, 
when the same is not even relevant in the xrase. 
The lower Court even discounted the same when it stated 
"Although neither dispositive nor controlling in this case, 
there is evidence...." 
The Court shold have actually stated, "Although 
neither helpful or relevent in this case, there is evidence..." 
as the only bearing that the same could have on the question 
of abandonment is that the Father "was a bad guy." Then from 
that conclude that "bad guys shouldhave their parental rights 
terminated.Tf 
Appellant respectfully submits that all of Finding #11 
should be disregarded: 
Paragraph 11. Although neither dispositive nor controlling 
in this case, there is evidence that during the period 
of time that Petitioner and Respondent lived together 
Respondent was abusive, physically and emotionally 
to Petitioner, to Petitioner's minor child from a prior 
marriage, and was emotionally abusive to the minor 
child, Richard Anthony Fazzio, who is the subject 
of this action. 
(a) Petitioner had a child from a previous marriage, 
Darren Christopher Holt (DOB 2/13/83), who lived 
with Petitioner at the time she was married to 
Respondent. Christopher was approximately four years 
old during thac period; 
(b) During the course of the marriage, Petitioner 
and her children, including R.A.F., were regularly 
subjected to mental and physical threats and abuse 
by Respondent; 
(c) Respondent admitted during the course of the 
marriage that he Msmacked KimM and that he did not 
make sure that either R.A.F. or the child Christopher 
were out of the roou when he slapped her. 
(d) Petitioner talked Respondent into seeking marriage 
counseling during the marriage; but not only did his 
abuse of her not change, Respondent actually beat her 
the day of counseling because he didn't like the things 
she said to the Counselor; 
(e) Darren Holt testified that his, own son, Christopher 
told him during his visitations that he was terrified 
of Respondent, and that Respondent had threatened him 
(Christopher) with a knife and hit him a number of times. 
Mr. Holt also testified Christopher told him Respondent 
at one point drove Petitioner and Christopher out of 
Petitioner's home with a gun and told them that if they 
came back, he (Respondent) would kill them. This 
testimony was corroborated by Petitioner; 
(f) When Mr. Holt confronted Respondent about this 
abuse of his son, Christopher, Respondent replied 
" . . . While Christopher is in my house, I will treat 
him the way I want. .f! this testimony was corroborated 
by Petitioner who described respondent's attitude toward 
Christopher as "mean and hateful . . .cruel . . ." 
(g) One one occasion, Respondent grabbed Petitioner 
by the hair and had her on the floor and was beating 
her head into the floor when she started calling for 
Christopher to run over to the neighbors and have them 
call the police. Petitioner testified that as 
Christopher moved, Respondent said "(I)f anybody moves, 
off that couch, I'll kill her." R.A.F. was one of 
the two children present on the couch observing 
this physical abuse to his mother and the threat 
to kill her. Both R.A.F. and Christopher were terrified' 
and they were both taken by the police to the YWCA 
after this incident. 
As noted above Finding 7(e) and 11(g) are identical, 
and further bears out the notion that they were blindly 
rubber stamped. 
More importantly, as noted above the child was only 
eleven months old at most, when any of this allegedly took 
place. (T. 30) 
As noted throughout the PROPOSED ADDITIONAL FINDINGS 
OF FACT, submitted by Appellee to the lower Court, and then 
endorsed essentially verbatim by the lower Court, that certain 
testimony was "unreliable, untrustworthy and unbelievable" 
the Finding that Appellant did anything improper to the 
step son Christopher is completely contrary to the sworn 
statement made by the Mother, when challeged by her former 
Husband Darren Holt for custody of Christopher. Note Exhibit 
18, wherein the Mother stated: 
8. All allegations contained in plaintiff's 
affidavit regarding defendant's boyfriend's 
(Cameron) alleged threats to the minor child 
are false, and in complete error. Defendant's 
boyfriend has a strong and supportive relationship 
with the minor child. (Christopher) 
However, the trial judge was so incensed by the 
alleged conduct of the Father of the child, he made findings 
beyond what was even claimed by the Petitioner. 
At page 655 of the transcript, Counsel for the Appellee, 
fortifies his position through the trial, by giving the 
following statement in closing argument: 
. . . .and his response to the problem that existed 
in that family > Judge, was abuse and violence, 
physical and emotional abuse to his stepson, abuse of 
his wife and while he never abused the child, and 
we've never claimed that he did, when he was abusing 
his wife in front of the child, when he was abusing 
the wife with the child in her arms, as has been 
testified to, that's as close as it comes to abuse of 
the child himself. 
The findings by the Judge is that the Father of the 
child was emotionally abusive to the child, something well 
beyond even the claims of the Appellee. Appellee's Counsel 
stated that in reference to emotional abuse, "we've never 
claimed that he did." 
Two parents not getting along, while one of the parents 
is holding the minor child, would not amount to "emotional 
abuse." 
Appellant respectfully submits that if the basis for 
terminating the parental rights of the Appellant is found at 
all in Finding of Fact #11, then this Court should reverse the 
lower Court and remand with instructions to immediately ^et 
out a meaningful visitation schedule for the Father. 
ARGUMENT NO. THREE 
HAD THE LOWER COURT FOLLOWED THE INSTRUCTIONS 
REGARDING APPROPRIATE FINDINGS IT COULD NOT 
HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE FATHER HAD 
ABANDONED HIS CHILD. , 
Appellant submits that this Court was very clear 
with its instructions as to what the lower Court was to do, 
in order to reach the ultimate determination of whether the 
Father had abandoned his child. 
Appellant submits that had the lower Court addressed 
the specific areas in the new findings, the lower Court could 
not, based upon the evidence, rule that the Father had abandoned 
his Son. 
At page 478 & 479 of the Opinion this Court stated: 
There was conflicting testimony about (1) the frequently 
ar.d duration of Fazziofs visits with the Child, (2) 
his treatment of the child during those visits; (3) 
Woodward's attempts to prevent Fazzio from visiting 
with the child; (4) Fazziofs payment of child support 
and (5) Fazzio!s provision of gifts to the child --
all facts crucial to the validity of the court's 
ultimate decision that Fazzio-s conduct had destroyed 
the parent-child relationship. 
The findings should set forth, with as much precision 
as possible (6) the number of times Fazzio visited 
the child during particular periods; (7) the length 
of each of the visits; (8) the number of visits 
Woodxvard intentionally prevented; (9) the sums 
Fazzio provided as child support, either personally 
or through his parents; (10) the number and type of 
gifts Fazzio gave te the child and (11) the occasions 
on which he gave them; (12) and the specific statements, 
acts, or omissions that demonstrate Fazziofs intent 
to either accept or disregard his obligations as a 
parent (e.g. instances of appellant performing 
child care functions like changing his diaper 
or feeding him, denying that the child was his 
responsibility, etc.,). 
Futher, the findings should explicitly address (13) 
the impact Woodward's frequent relocation had on Fazziofs 
ability to maintain contact with the Child, (14) 
the effect Fazziofs living and working outside 
Utah had on his visitation; (15) the manner and effect 
of any refusal on Fazziofs part to legally acknowledge 
his paternity , and (16) any other factors bearing 
on whether Fazzic consciously disregarded the. child 
to such an extent that the parent-child relationship 
was destroyed. 
As already noted by this Court in this case when on 
appeal before, at page 477 this Court stated: 
The *Wulffensfgin test for determining abandonment in 
termination proceedings requires proof of two elements. 
First, the party seeking termination must prove that 
Mthe parent's conduct evidenced a conscious disregard, 
for his or her parental obligations" to the child. 
Timperly, 750 P. 2d at 1236. Second, the party 
must demonstrate that the "disregard led to the 
destruction of the parent-child relationship." 
Id.; Wulffenstein, 560 P. 2d at 334. Both of 
these elements must be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence. See Santosky vs. Kramer, 455 
U.S. 745, 769 (1982); In re J. Children, 664 P. 2d 
1158, 1159 (Utah 1983). 
At the outset of this argument it is critical to note that 
the burden is on the Mother to establish both elements, and 
therefore the father has no burden whatsoever. 
Equally significant is the standard of proof, ie: by 
clear and convincing evidence - the hignest standard known 
to law, short of being charged with a crime. 
With that background, the Appellant respectfully 
submits that the Appellee completely failed both as to burden 
of proof and the standard of proof, because the Mother herself 
stated that she had no idea of what contact, etc., that the 
Father had with the Child, when the child was picked up and 
taken to his folks. 
On page 104 and 105 of the transcript, with the Mother 
testifying she stated on cross examination: 
Q. Now, I want you to zero in on my question, please. 
Do you — have you observed that Cameron is not 
there seeing the child during the times that Richaid 
and Stephanie have picked the child up and brought 
him back? 
A. No, sir. Ifm not there. 
With very few exceptions the sole basis for many of 
the FINDINGS OF FACT, was exclusively the Mother's testimony, 
yet she admitted on Cross-examination, that she did not know 
what contacts, etc., were going on between the Child and his 
Father when the Child left her home for visitation. 
As a matter of law, she must show the following items, 
and she carries the burden of proof, and in addition the level 
of proof must be clear and convincing evidence, yet she admits 
when cornered, that she lias no basis at all for her testimony 
regarding no contact, no gifts, no bonding, etc. 
As to the specific instructions given by this Court, in 
this very action, the Appellant submits the following: 
1. "the frequency and duration of Fazzio's visits 
with the child." 
As to this issue, the Court made FINDING OF FACT #7(g): 
g. Although Respondent came around four or five 
times from the date of their separation in September 
of 1987, through September of 1988, he spent very 
little time with R.A.F.. After September of 1988, 
Respondent never came to see the child nor telephone, 
nor contacted the child; 
The support for this Finding is found on page 75, 
wherein the Mother stated when questioned by her Attorney: 
Q. You said that he came around four or five times 
until September of 1988; is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. To your knowledge, when was the next time he 
personally saw R.A.F., to your knowledge? 
A. In March of 1990. 
Q* In March of 1990 . Okay, And how do you know he 
personally saw R.'A.F. , at that time? 
A. Because we went into Court and the Court said for 
him to see him tomorrow. 
In marshalling all of the facts in support of this 
FINDING, the Court should know that the Mother made similar 
statements at pages 72 through 74, however, the sole basis for 
the said FINDING, is from the Mother only, and the statements 
are essentially the same. 
Appellant submits that this FINDING OF FACT, is wholly 
unsupported by any evidence whatsoever, as a careful review 
of the question by her own Counsel, states twice in the same 
question, "to your knowledge?11 
The only evidence coming from this testimony by the 
Mother is that she has no knowledge, just as she testified on 
Cross Examination at page 104 and 105. She just doesn't 
know one way or another. 
With the burden of proof with the Mother, and the 
standard of proof being b}^  clear and convincing evidence, 
the Mother has nothing to substantiate this FINDING. 
On the otherhand, as this Court noted in this case 
as page 477: 
To succeed in challenging the findings, appellant 
must prove they are clearly erroneous, i.e., against 
the clear weight of the evidence. State ex rel. J.R.T. 
vs. Timperly, 750 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah App. 1988). 
At page 228 of the transcript, with the Appellant's 
Mother testifying on direct examination, she stated: 
Q. I see. Did you see a pattern at that time of 
visitation between Cameron and R.A.F.? 
A. Definitely. 
Q. And can you -- was that ever other week, or what 
did you see? 
A. When Cameron -- when they were first divorced, or 
separated until the annulment, we were seeing 
R.A.F. every weekend, either at our home or Cameron 
would pick him up, and that went on for a period 
of at least six months, and then it became every 
other weekend. 
Q. Okay. So from September of 1986, for, are you 
saying another six months from that point on? 
A. I believe it started October of f86 and we saw 
him regularly, at first, every weekend, then every 
other weekend, up until Kim sent us the -- gave 
us the note saying we couldn't see R.A.F. any more, 
In October of 89f. We saw him fairly regularly 
for three years. And during that period of time, 
Cameron saw R.A.F. regularly. 
Again on direct examination, the Appellant's mother 
testified, beginning at page 307: 
Q. And now I asked you in reference to visitation, 
you've talked about a series of times that 
Cameron and R.A.F. were together and you were 
present. Have you told us about all of those? 
A. Not ail of them. 
Q. Okay. Give me an idea of the quantity and quality 
of that, too, please. 
A. Between f87 and f90, it was continuous. The quality 
time, I think was quality time. They shared a 
lot together and they had a good time with each 
other. They had a loving, caring relationship, 
good rapport, it was a father-son quality, period. 
On direct examination, the Father testified regarding 
the visits with the minor child at page 512: 
Q. How -- how often did you see the child when you 
returned back from Cheyenne? 
A. When I came back from Cheyenne, it was on a 
weekly basis and it was every weekend, I had 
R.A.F. two, three days, sometimes, sometimes three, 
usually two, all of them overnight, generally 
at my dad's house, sometimes at my grandmother's 
house where I was living, and Kim was quite liberal 
with the visitation. 
Again on direct examination, the Father testified regarding 
the visits with the minor child at page 518: 
Q. Okay. How often did your child, say, from 
December '87 up to the Child's birthday in 1988? 
A. It was, I believe it was weekly, every week. It 
may have been every two weeks, but I think it was 
more likely weekly then. 
Lastly, the Father testified on page 526 of the 
transcript as follows: 
Q. Has there ever been a time to this day that you 
have not opted to visit with R.A.F.? 
A. No, I -- no, I visit R.A.F. every chance I get. I 
will -- like I drive hundreds of miles to be with 
my son. He means the world to me. I cannot stress 
how much my son means to me. 
As a result, Appellant submits that there is no evidence 
to support the specific FINDING, and further that it is "against 
the clear weight of the evidence." 
Futhermore, the Appellant submits that in reference 
to "the frequency and duration of Fazzio's visits with the Child" 
there can be no question that the Father saw the Child regularly, 
except as prevented by the Mother as will be discussed below, 
and that his visits included the entire weekends, and sometimes 
a full three days at a time. 
Appellant submits, in reference to the second item, 
that was to be determined by the lower Court: 
2. Fazzio's treatment of the child during those visits" 
the lower Court made FINDING OF FACT #7(u) 
u. Even though Respondent was provided with court-
ordered visitation after the filing of the instant 
lawsuit, he did not make an effort to spend much time 
with the child during the court-ordered visitations. 
Ken Kresser, the husband of Barbara Kresser and step-
father of Mark Woodward and Petitioner's present 
husband, testified that after the May 1990, court-
ordered visitation with Respondent he asked R.A.F. 
about the visitation. R.A.F. replied that he had gone 
to the park. When Mr. Kresser asked him if Cameron 
(respondent) was there with him, R..A.F. stated "no, 
he was sleeping." 
The support for the particular incident is found 
when Ken Kresser testified on direct examination on page 173 
of the transcript. 
Appellant would not perhaps deny that after he had 
driven all night to be with his son, that he did in fact take 
a nap, while other members of the Appellant's family spent 
some time in the park across the street from Appellant's parent's 
home. 
In fact, even if this were not an isolated incident, 
Appellant submits that it surely is no basis for the Court to 
find that, "Even though Respondent was provided with court-ordered 
visitation after the filing of the instant lawsuit, he did 
not make an effort to spend much time with the child during the 
court-ordered visitation." 
If one were to look at the situation objectively, the 
reasoning of the Court is as follows: Even though you worked 
in Las Vegas until the end of the day of Friday, and then left 
right after work and drove all the way to Salt Lake City, Utah 
through the night, since you took a nap on Saturday, you were 
not making an effort to see the child for court-ordered visitation. 
Appellant submits that the reasoning is without merit, 
as the only reason he would be coming to Salt Lake City, Utah, 
from Las Vegas, for the short stay, as he had to be back to work 
in Las Vegas on Monday morning, was so that he could spend the 
few precious moments with his son. 
The whole basis for this FINDING, is based upon Ken 
Kresser testifying as to what the child said. 
The child was born on September 17, 1986, and this 
occured during the month of Hay, 1990, so the child was just 
over three and one-half years of age when questioned by his 
Step-father's Step father. 
Appellant submits that even if the child were old 
enough to perceive in reality what was going on, he surely 
had been through enough of the family gatherings where the Father 
was put down, to know what the Step-father's Step-father wanted 
him to say. Note Finding #7(h) regarding how the child was 
drilled after every visit. 
Appellant submits that such questionable evidence 
is a far cry from any clear and convincing level of proof, 
and is clearly against the great weight of the evidence as found 
in the transcript beginning at page 223 with the Appellant's 
Mother on direct examination: 
Q. Did you see him care for the child on that 
occasion, other then just play with R.A.F.? 
A. I >think we cared for Pv.A.F. most of the time 
because we were there. 
Q. Have you ever seen him change the diaper of the 
child other than in the hospital? 
A. Absolutely. At my home. Many times. He would 
come and R.A.F. would need to be changed and he 
would change him, no question. 
Q. Can you give me a ball park figure of how many times? 
A. Oh, every time he needed to be changed; however 
many times an infant needs to be changed when hefs 
at his grandmontherfs: 20, 30. 
Q. What about other needs when the child was there 
at your home, other than change the diaper? 
A. As I mentioned before, Cameron would feed him. I 
know of several occasions at our home when Cameron 
would bring him over to visit, it would be dinnertime, 
Cameron would sit down and feed him. At my mother-
in-law's, we would go over to visit when Cameron 
would always prepare R.A.F.'s food and feed him 
himself. He never expected anyone else to do 
that for R.A.F. He -- I know that he bathed R.A.F., 
got him ready for bed. 
Again on page 227 of the transcript with the Appellant!s 
Mother testifying on direct examination: 
Q. When you say he'd play with the child, what do 
you mean? 
A. When R.A.F. was really little, Cameron would get 
down on the floor, >play around with him, you know, 
play with him, play with his toys. As he got older 
they played with trucksra lot down on the floor. 
We have a park directly across the street from 
our home, Cameron takes him to the park, they'd 
play on the playground there. Sometimes Cameron 
would take him for an ice cream cone. 
Again with the Appellant's Mother testifying on direct 
examination, at page 265 is the following: 
R.A.F. would sit in Cameron's lap, they would sit 
on the floor head-to-head, eye-to-eye, down on the 
floor playing. They had a very close relationship. When 
-- very often, Cameron would get R.A.F. ready for bed, 
put his night clothes on him. We had kind of a little 
ritual at our house. With my children, after they had bathed 
and gotten ready * for bed, it was quiet play time 
to get ready to go to bed, rather than rev them up 
so they wouldn't go to bed, and they would sit and 
do that, sometimes, R.A.F. would fall asleep curled 
up cuddled next to his father on the loveseat in our 
family room. 
Again on page 293 of the transcript with the Appellantfs 
mother still testifying on direct examination is the following: 
Q. And then taking it up there in May, did yoa 
observe Cameron and R.A.F. play with the toys? 
A. They spent most of the time in the house playing 
on the floor of our family room with that truck 
and the large brown one that Cameron Had given 
him previously. The two of them played with that 
almost exclusively. There was a period of time 
during the two-day period where they were over 
in the park on the slide playing. They played 
almost exclusively with those two trucks. They 
would — R.A.F. liked the large car carrier, it's 
about this large and its has three smaller cars 
in it. He liked to delegate who plays with which 
car, he has to have a certain one and then somebody 
else can have the others. The trailers are removeable 
and he would play with -- switch the trailers, 
they would switch trucks and trade off. R.A.F. 
would try to stick the truck that fits in the car 
carrier into the large -- the large one was a van 
type, and he got very frustrated because they 
wouldn't fit, they were too wide, so we got other 
trucks and they played with those as well, putting 
them in and out of the van. 
In addition to the foregoing, Exhibit 12, which was 
admitted into evidence, was referred to by the Appellant's 
Mother at page 394: 
We had gone -- this is just a little ways away from 
our house. We had gone to feed ducks. There was 
my husband, myself, my younger son, Brian, R.A.F. and 
Cameron. I had taken a loaf of bread and we were throwing 
bread into the ducks, and R%A.F. came over -- Cameron 
went over and sat down to feed the ducks and R.A.F. 
took a piece of bread and went over and sat in his 
dad's lap and they fed the ducks together. 
The Appellant's Father testified on direct examination 
at page 418 and 419 of the transcript as follows: 
Q. Have you seen R.A.F. take care -- excuse me, 
Cameron take care of R.A.F. when they're 
together? 
A. Yes, I have. Right from the time when R.A.F. was 
little, when Cameron would bring him over, you 
know, it was a big deal again, between Cameron 
and I to -- if the baby needed to be changed, 
I says, huh uh, I went through this and now it's 
your turn, and he'd take him in, change him, 
bathe him at night, put his pajamas on him, 
sit and rock with him sometimes at night before 
bed. 
Not only did the Appellant, his Mother and his Father 
each testify as to the treatment by the Appellant of the child 
during the many visits with the child, Appellant called Jerald 
Alvey, a person who worked with Cameron in Wyoming, who testified 
at page 622, on a visit to Wyoming with the child: 
And he -- he brought him in and he had a little 
chocolate on his face, he was eating some chocolate, 
and came in and Cameron went and changed his diaper 
and took care of him and everything. 
Appellant submits that the lower Court merely rubber 
stamped what Appellee's Counsel sutmitted, regarding what 
Appellant did during his visitation with the child, and endorsed 
a single time when Cameron took a nap, after driving all nignt 
to be with his child. 
The lower Court seemed to totally overlook the fact 
that Cameron had driven all the way from Las Vegas, after 
getting off work on Friday, and driving all night, just to 
spend a Saturday and Sunday with his boy, when it concludes, 
lfhe did not make an effort to spend much time with the child 
during the court-ordered visitations" merely because he took 
a nap on Saturday. 
Appellant submits that FINDING 7(u) regarding this 
isolated incident, as portrayed by a three and a half year old 
child, as the total reference to the treatment of the child 
during the visits, can not reach the clear and convincing 
level to conclude that the Father abandoned his child, and is with-
out question against the clear weight of the evidence. 
Appellant submits in reference to the third item, 
that was to be determined by the lower Court , the lower Court 
made no FINDING whatsoever, and totally ignored this directive 
by the Court 
3. Woodward's attempts to prevent Fazzio from visiting 
the child. 
As to the evidence regarding the same, the Mother of 
the child herself testified that she had been to see an attorney 
who stated that she had to have a whole year go by without 
Cameron seeing the child, as noted on page 78 and 79 of the 
transcript: 
Q. Were there -- did there come a time when his 
parents, Dick and Stephanie Fazzio, asked to 
visit with the Child? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And did you allow that? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When was that that you recall that they first made 
that request? 
A. It was after Cameron -- not too long after 
Cameron quit seeing him. 
Q. Which would have been not too long after --
A. So it would have been --
Q. -- September of '38? 
A. It would have been October of '88. 
Q. Did you know whether or not you had any legal 
obligation to allow them to see the child? 
A. Well, Cameron hadn't been around, so we had talked 
to an attorney about terminating -- not you, another 
attorney -- about terminating parental rights, and 
he said a year had to go by. And I told her we had 
been allowing the grandparents visitation and she 
said that was good, if the parents were seeing --
the grandparents were seeing him and the parent 
still wasn't, that was very good. 
As noted in the Decree of Annulment, the Appellant is 
entitled to visitation as the parties can agree. This Court 
has once before commented on this provision at page 475, in 
footnote #1, wherein this Court stated: 
"Such a provision is not terribly helpful to parties, 
like these whose breakups is accompanied by considerable 
rancor." 
Appellant submits that not only was such an arrangment 
ladened with trouble, it literally rose to the level of having 
to get a court order to spend time with the child. 
This was borne out, somewhat inadvertangly by the Step-
Father's Step-Father's testimony, at page 176,.wherein Mr. 
Kresser stated: 
Q. So it's in 1990 that you observed that he was 
unruly? 
A. Right. After he started having visitation rights 
because of the court orders this year. 
Appellant submits that there is no question that he 
literally had to petition the Court for specific visitation 
so that the Mother could no longer prevent the Father from having 
a meaningful relationship with his Child. 
It is clear that the Mother went to her Attorney, 
Terry Christiansen, in Summit County, and inquired what would 
need to be done, to cut Cameron off from seeing his child. 
She is informed that it takes a whole year of no 
visitation, and so she then prepares Exhibit #4, and gives it 
to the Grandparents when they return the child for Cameron in 
October 1939. 
The Appellant's Mother testified in reference to Exhibit 
#4, at page 274, wherein she stated: 
Q. Now, you were telling me about, and I didn't 
mean to get a field; you were talking about the 
soccer ball. Did -- did you -- tell me what you 
observed in reference to Cameron and R.A.F. after 
the time that you just made reference to, in 
reference to the soccer ball in October of 1989. 
A. After October of f89 we did not see R.A.F. again 
until Commissioner Peuler made the ruling, and 
we saw him in March. 
Q. Did you receive a letter from Kim in reference to 
the visitation? 
A. She gave me a letter, October, when we returned 
R.A.F. to her. 
She then goes on and explains Exhibit #4, which was 
from Kim, terminating all visitation with the minor Child, which 
gives rise to the Petition for specific visitation filed in 
October of 1989. 
The Mother was successful in keeping the Child from 
his Father and his parents, from that time in October as noted 
above to March of 1990. 
Appellant and his family had been totally cut off from 
contact with the Child, and so they spend their Christmas with 
this Child in Mardh. 
The Appellant's Mother describes the occasion and what 
occurred thereafter beginning at page 291: 
Cameron gave R.A.F. another huge -- another -- one of 
his fleet Cameron's building, it's a large white 
diesel. We have him campanion trucks to the one that 
we gave him on his birthday, we gave him the Tonka dump 
truck for Christmas, we gave him a large grader and 
a backhoe. 
Q. Does he take these home with him, to Kim's house? 
A. He tried to take the truck home. 
Q. Which truck? 
A. The large white one. 
Q. From? . 
A. From Cameron. 
Q. Okay, What happened? 
A. That was in March. He wanted to take the truck 
home, he took some candy and there was a gift from 
my mother-in-law that she sent up from California, 
it was a little black jogging suit. We drove up, 
we got out of the car, R.A.F. was eating the candy, 
I was carrying the jump suit in a box, my husband 
was carrying a white truck. We got to the door 
and Mark stopped us and he said, "Our attorney 
said we can't take anything from you people." 
And he put the truck down on the porch, my husband 
picked it up and said, this doesn't belong to any 
of us, it's R.A.F.'s. We didn't give him all these 
things, some of these came from his great-grandmother, 
and Mark wouldn't let him have it. Took it back --
took the truck, you know, wouldn't take - made 
Dick keep it. R.A.F. started to cry. 
Kim came running out of the house screaming at the 
top of her lungs, this is a Kim I have never seen, 
telling Dick, grow up, Dick, just grow up, Dick, 
and stop telling -- calling Mark -- or telling 
R.A.F. things about Mark and me. And I looked 
at her, and I said, Kim, that might be your style, 
but we have never, never done that. 
By this time, R.A.F. was almost hysterical, he 
was crying, he was sobbing, we thought it was 
best to leave. I told R.A.F., don't worry, R.A.F. 
we'll -- Grandma will keep your truck at her house 
and you can play with it when you come down and 
we left. 
And as we were leaving, Mark came, took the candy 
out of R.A.F.'s hand, he was chewing on a piece 
of candy he ripped it out of his hand and 
gave it back to me and says, here, we can't 
keep this, either, and I just took it and left. 
As this Court will note, the trial of this action began 
in August of 1990, and so the opportunity to see the child 
immediately before the trial, should the Court want to talk 
to the minor child, would be a most critical time for the Mother 
to prevent the Father from seeing the child. This is especially 
so, since the Father only gets to see the child for one weekend 
per month. 
For this July visit, as with each visit, the Appellant 
must drive to Salt Lake City, Utah, from Las Vegas, Nevada, after 
work on Friday. This means that he will drive essentially all 
night long to arrive in time to get some rest before going 
to Coalville to pick up his Child first thing, Saturday morning. 
Appellant did just that and arrived in Coalville at 
the scheduled time to be with his Child only to come upon a vacant 
home, as neither the Child nor any other member of his family 
was there. 
Appellant was devastated, not only because of the 
great disappointment of not being with his child, but concerned 
about the upcoming trial where he had not seen his boy since 
June, and the Court would be deciding the matter in August. 
Appellant was wholly unable to locate the Child or the 
Mother and returned to Salt Lake City, on Saturday. 
Then again on Sunday, he drove all the way to Coalville 
to see his boy, but again he left empty handed, and returned 
to Salt Lake and ultimately Las Vegas, after making this extreme 
effort to see his Child, and not even getting the chance tc-
talk to him on the phone. Note the transcript at page 300 and 
following. Also note page 526 and following where the Father 
testified on direct examination: 
Q. Tell me -- let me just cut right through to the 
bottom line if I might. Tell me about what you 
did in July of this year to see the Child. 
A. July of this year? Oh, God. In July of this year, 
1 came down, I work all day and then I drive all 
night and then we drive again up to Coalville 
and we get there and they're gone. Nobody is there. 
I drive -- drive and drive and drive. I was very 
disappointed, extremely disappointed. 
Q. What did you do? 
A. I drove around looked for Kim. I didn't --
wasn't a lot I could do. I looked, I called, 
and nobody seemed to know where they were. 
The Father goes on through the next few page of transcript 
and explains what efforts he made on Sunday, as well, to be 
with his son. 
This very specific visitation time was ordered by the 
Court, and reflects, perhaps with greater importance, the struggle 
that the Father had to visit with his Child, as the visitation 
after the Annulment was "as the patties can agree," whereas 
this visitation was by Order of the Court, "like it or not." 
At trial, the Mother at first claimed that she did not 
know it was the Father's weekend, but recanted that when faced 
with the phone tape of the Appellant's Parent's messages, wherein 
she stated that the child was sick, so Cameron need not come 
Cameron does not get the message from the tape however, 
until after returning from Coalville, empty handed. 
Appellant respectfully submits that the entire case 
bears out the Mother's intent to cut the Appellant from his 
son. She had seen her Attorney, and consistent with his 
instructions she cuts off all contact by way of her letter, 
and then when faced with the Petition for specific visitation, 
she responded to the same, by filing her petition to terminate 
parental rights. 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the lower Court and remand with instructions to set out a 
meaningful visitation schedule for the Father with his Child. 
As to the Fourth instruction, regarding the FINDINGS, 
Fazzio's payment of child support, the lower Court made the 
following three FINDINGS: 
7(d) After the parties separated for the last time, 
Petitioner spoke to Respondent many times about needing 
money and child support, and he refused to give her any 
child support. 
7(f) Petitioner received no child support from Respondent 
and she tried constantly to locate him, but was unable. 
Even though Respondent'* s parents, Richard and Stephanie 
Fazzio, lived at the same address during this entire 
period of time, they would refuse to tell her Respondent's 
address. When Petitioner saw Respondent, she asked 
for her child support and he refused to give it to her. 
8(a) The testimony was clear at the trial that Respondent 
owed to Petitioner some $3,000.00 in back child support 
at the time of trial in this matter. 
In marshalling the evidence in support of 7(d), and 
7(f) Appellant submits that the record is totally void of any 
evidence that the Appellant refused to give her any child support. 
The Mother however, testified in several places that 
Appellant had not paid any child support. Note the transcript 
at pages 107, 121 and 122. 
The total basis for this FINDING, is found exclusively 
in the testimony of the Mother, who testified repeatedly that 
when she asked Respondent for money, he would say that he would 
get her what he could, or that he himself did not have any money. 
Note the transcript at page 67, wherein the Mother is on direct 
examination: 
Q. Okay. Did you ever ask respondent for money for 
R.A.F.? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And what was his response? 
A. "I don't have it." "I'll get it to youM, just 
nonchalant. 
In addition, it is important to note that during the 
time in question, the Mother was on public assistance, and receiving 
payments from the State. (T-122). 
She testified that she did not file any Petition against 
him for arrearage because he was to pay Recovery Services and 
not her (T-121), and when it Game right down to it she did not 
know what he paid to Recovery Services. (T-122). 
It addition, the Mother testified at page 107 that she 
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her by Cameron as and for child support, in the first place. 
On the otherhand, the Appellantfs Father testified 
about the Appellant's ability to generate income..(T-428) 
He also testified about Cameron cashing checks at the shop so 
that Cameron could give some cash to the Mother, (T-453) 
In addition, he testified about providing the car 
to the Mother, but she abandoned the same, and so the Fazzios 
got it started, and then sold the same. After it was abandoned 
all they could get for it was $75.00. (1-514 and following) 
It is true that the Father did not pay his child 
support regularly on even consistently to the Mother as required 
by Court order, however, there were two reasons for the same. 
First, as testified to by the Father, (T-556 and following) 
that any monies payable would be paid to Recovery Services and 
not the Mother, and that the payment or lack of payment to them 
did not increase or decrease any sums to the Mother. 
Second, Appellant had four dependants, himself, his 
present wife (who was expecting T-552), daughter Jennifer, and Alicia. 
(T -526) . Since, being critically, injured in.his automobile accident, 
Appellant was only able to make a fraction of income of even 
Poverty level. Note the transcript at page 581, showing gross 
income 2-16-89 of $3,243.00, and the transcript at page 526 
for the year prior. 
With this amount of income, the Appellant paid some 
money to the Mothfer, but in addition provided various necessities 
f6r the children as he could, ie: diapers, medicine, shoes, coat. 
(T-52S). 
Appellant submits that it is fair to say that he had 
not paid all that much in the way of child support, but it is 
not fair to say that he refused to pay, nor is it fair to say 
that he did not pay any child support. 
Futhermore, considering his financial ability to pay, 
he really did pay as best he could, with four dependants, going 
on five, and having a gross income of $3,243.00. 
Appellant respectfully submits that it was against the 
clear weight of the evidence to suggest that he did not pay 
any child support and furthermore that he refused to pay. 
As to the fifth instruction to the lower Court, regarding 
the FINDINGS, Fazzio's provision of gifts for the child, the Court 
made the following FINDING: 
7(1) Mrs. Fazzio did testify that some toys were 
purchased for the child by Respondent, but in light 
of the fact she testified her son did not pay child 
support because he had been unemployed and his earnings 
were low, her testimony was unreliable and the Court 
believes it was the paternal grandparents who were 
thoughtful enough to purchase the few toys in question 
for R.A.F. 
As noted above, this is merely an attempt to get the 
Appellate Court to defer to the lower Court's determination 
of credibility, since only the lower Court can test the demeanor 
of the witness, ect. 
However, there is no basis to suggest, even if the lower 
Court questioned Appellant's Mother regarding the gifts, there 
is no basis to suggest that the Appellant did not shower the 
child with the various gifts, involving trucks, walkie-talkies, 
etc. 
As noted in the transcript beginning at page 109, the 
Mother testified that she did not know if the walkie-talkies 
given the child came from Cameron. She testified that she did 
not know if Cameron had purchased the child the big brown truck, 
nor did she know if Cameron has purchased the big white one, 
as well for the child. 
Appellant submits that there in fact is no basis to 
suggest from the Motherfs testimony that no gifts were in fact 
given to the Child by his Father, as she recanted her testimony 
about the same. (T- 109 & 112) 
On the other hand, the Court had boxes of toys and 
puzzles and books, and articles of clothing physically produced 
in open Court and pictures, volumes of pictures, of the Child 
and his Father and his family of the many memorable times with 
this Child, who was not even four years old at the time of trial. 
The lower Court may say that it finds certain evidence 
unreliable, but no one can ignore the volumes of evidence that 
the Father provided many, many gifts, etc. for the child and 
on meaningful occasions. 
Appellant submits, that what does speak volumes is that 
it is undisputed that neither the Father nor his Family had 
any Christmas with the child in 1989, as it required a Court 
order for them to spend their Christmas with the child in 
March of 1990. 
Due to a page limitation of Appellant's Brief, with 
the exception of the FINDING regarding acknowledging paternity 
Appellant will briefly respond to the balance of the instructions 
given by this Court to the lower Court regarding the FINDINGS. 
As to the sixth instruction to the lower Court, th€i 
number of times Fazzio visited the child during particular 
periods, the lowerG6urt made FINDINGS 7(h), 7(i) and 7(j). 
None of these address particular times that Fazzio visited 
the child during certain periods they only suggest that the 
child did say he had not seen his Father, when he was "always" 
asked after visitation, and that the testimony of the Father 
and his folks was unreliable. 
As to the seventh instruction to the lower Court, the 
length of each of the visits, the lower Court completely ignored 
and did not address at all. 
As to the eighth instruction to the lower Court, 
the number of visits Woodward intentionally prevented, the lower 
Court completely ignored and did not address at all. 
As to the ninth instruction to the lower Court, the sums 
Fazzio provided as child support, either personally or through 
his parents, the lower Court made FINDINGS 7(k) and 8(c). 
FINDING 7(k) states that while payments were made by 
Appellant!s parents for child support, only three had been 
reinbursed by the Father, and FINDING 8(c) states that the 
Mother never received any money from Respondent or any one, 
on an account with Respondents name on it. (This Court needs 
to look at the specific findings, as Counsel has had to severely 
simplify the same for purposes herein.) 
There is no question that the FINDINGS, provide no 
underlying facts as to the child support provided either by 
the Appellant nor by his parents. 
As to the tenth instruction to the lower Court, the 
number and type of gifts Fazzio gave to the Child, the lower 
Court made no findings whatsoever and did not address at all. 
However, the record is replete with the number and type 
of gifts Fazzio gave the Child. Note the transcript at page 
355 and following, page 407 and following and 519 and following. 
As to the eleventh instruction to the lower Court, 
the occasions on which Fazzio gave gifts, the lower Court made 
no findings whatsoever and did not address it at all. 
As to the twelveth instruction to the lower Court, the 
statements, acts, ommissions reflecting Fazzio's intent to accept 
or disregard his obligation as a parent, the lower Court 
made FINDINGS 7(b) and 7(c) regarding what the Court found to 
be the case while the parties were married. 
There are no findings regarding this instruction, 
involving the time after the parties had their marriage annulled 
to the time of the Mother's Petition to Terminate Parental Rights. 
As to the thirteenth instruction to the lower Court, 
the impact of Woodward's frequent relocation had on Fazziofs 
ability to maintain contact with the child, the lower Court 
made FINDING 7(t), wherein the lower Court stated: 
7(c) The Court finds that rather than Petitioner's 
movements from different residences being the cause 
of Respondentsfs failure to visit with the child, 
Respondent failed to have contact with the child to 
avoid paying child suport ....(The Court then 
goes on about a single incident where the Father 
saw the Motherfs sister, and asked her not to tell 
the Mother.) 
Appellant submits that this conclusion is without merit, 
as the child support was to go to Recovery Services, and not 
to the mother, according to everyone's testimony, and the money 
going to the Mother from the State, would not be affected in 
the slightest by whether the Father was paying any money to 
them or not. 
There is no basis for the lower Court to fail to 
address the impact of Woodward's frequent relocations on 
Fazzio's ability to maintain contact with the child. 
As to the fourteenth instruction to the lower Court, the 
effect Fazzio's living and working outside Utah had on his 
visitation, the lower Court made no findings whatsoever and 
did not address at all. 
Appellant will come back to the fifteenth instruction 
regarding acknowledging paternity. 
As to the sixteenth and last instruction to the lower 
Court, regarding any other factors bearing on whether Fazzio 
consciously disregarded the child to such an extent that the 
parent-child relationship was destroyed, the lower Court made 
no findings whatsoever and did not address at all. 
However, this is a crucial area for the lower Court 
to address as noted in the prior appeal, in the Opinion at page 
477, wherein this Court stated that not only must the finding 
T-pfl^ rt that there has been a conscious disregard of che Father's 
parental obligations, but second, thedisregard led to the 
destruction of the parent child relationship. 
As to the fifteenth instruction to the lower Court, 
the manner and effect of any refusal on Fazziofs part to legally 
acknowledge his paternity, the lower Court made FINDINGS #10(a) 
arid #10(b). 
10(a) Darren Holt, Petitioner's husband from a prior 
marriage, and the father of Petitioner's child Darren 
Christopher Holt, received notice in approximately 
December of 1986 from the Department of Recovery 
Services stating he was responsible for child support 
for R.A.F. Mr. Holt testified that he approached 
Respondent numerous times regarding this situation and 
asked him to submit to tests or sign a legal document 
admitting to the paternity of R.A.F.. Respondent 
steadfastly refused to ever sign a document with the 
Department of Recovery Services acknowledging his 
paternity with R.A.F. Mr. Holt contacted Respondent 
some 14 or 15 times attempting to get him to admit 
to his paternity of R.A.F. with the State and 
Respondent consistently refused; 
10(b) Although Respondent claimed he had signed 
a document upon the birth of R.A.F. acknowledging 
paternity, Respondent was unable to provide a copy 
of any documents, or even an identification of a 
document he had signed acknowledging paternity when 
challenged to do so at trial by Petitioner's Counsel 
The result of Respondent's failure to acknowledge 
the paternity of R.A.F. to the State of Utah was 
that Darren Holt paid child support to the State 
of Utah's Department of Recovery Services on behalf 
of R.A.F., an obligation that was rightfully 
that of the Respondent. 
Appellant submits that even assuming this Findings to 
be accurate, there is no Finding whatsoever of a manner and effect, 
of any refusal on Fazzio's part to legally acknowledge his 
paternity. 
In otherwords, what if anything, do either of these 
findings have to do with destroying a parent-child relationship? 
There was no effect whatsoever on the relationship 
of the Father with his Child, and could not be, because the 
child was too young to understanding any of this. 
That is the case, unless the Mother drills the child 
of four, at most, on this allegation, but even then it is not 
the Father destroying the parent-child relationship, it would 
have been the Mother. 
As to actually what Mr. Holt testified to was that 
the Father stated that he had already signed the apprcpr iate 
papers and that it was therefore not necessary for the Father 
to do anything more with Recovery Services or anyone else. 
At page 160 of the Transcript, Mr. Holt testified on 
Cross-examination, as follows: 
Q. You ccine out and talk to Cameron on these different 
ten occasions, Cameron would tell you it's no longer 
necessary to go to Recovery Services and sign the 
papers there; is that correct? 
A. To my recollection, he never came out and said that, 
no. Basically, what he said is that there -- it 
wasn't necessary for him to do any -- well, I guess 
you're right, what you said was correct. It was 
not necessary for him to go down and sign any other 
papers, but I was still held accountable for his 
son, even though he had signd -- his name was on 
the birth certificate. 
As to any question that the State may have to as to 
who the Father of the child was, the Mother herself testified that 
she was not sure whether it was her ex-husband Darren Holt or 
the Father that needed to take the blood tests. (T-101 ) 
Surely this Court is well aware of the fact that the 
H.L.A. blood testing is a method of exclusion of paternity, 
and therefore there would only be need of Darren Holt to submit 
to the test, not the Father, herein. 
The father on the otherhand, testified at page 593: 
Q. Have you ever formally gone to the State of Utah 
or any agency thereof and taken responsibility for 
your son, to your knowledge? Yes or no. 
A. Yes. 
Q. When? 
A. September 17, 1986, L.D.S. Hospital, it was notarized 
right there right then that night, to my knowledge 
I had -- that was what I had to do. 
Perhaps the most significant problem that the Appellant 
has with the FINDING, is where did this child get his name 
R.A.F., if the Father of the child was ever in question. As 
noted on pages 222 and 491, the name has not only the Father in 
the same, but has a heritage of the Father's family in the same. 
Appellant submits that surely one can not say that 
because he did not have an ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PATERNITY, in 
his pocket when he is on the stand, that that is proof that 
therefore the "Respondent was unable to provide a copy of any 
document, or even an identification of a document he had signed 
acknowledging paternity when challenged to do so at trial by 
Petitioner's Counsel!1 
In reality, everyone testified that the Office of 
Recovery Services was working with Appellant regarding tihild 
support. This is significant as the Appellant never signed 
anything at the request of Mr. Holt, nor did he ever take any 
of Recovery Services, chat did not have the correct information 
and the Mother would have been the sole source for the same. 
Hence, all that Mr. Holt had to testify to merely 
goes to show that the Appellee was misleading the Office of 
Recovery Services, rather than, showing any denial of paternity 
by the Appellant. 
This is particularly so, since it is the Appellee 
requesting assistance and she is the only one in contact with 
Recovery Services. 
ARGUMENT NO. 
THERE IS NO BASIS IN ANY OF THE FINDINGS TO SUGGEST 
THAT THE-FATHER DESTROYED THE PARENT CHILD RELATIONSHIP. 
In this case, this Court has held in the prior Appeal, 
at page 477, as follows: 
The Wulffenstein test for determining abandonment in 
termination proceedings requires proof of two elements. 
First, the party seeking termination must prove that 
"the parent's conduct evidenced a conscious disregard 
for his or her parental obligations11 to the child. 
Timperly, 750 P.2d at 1236. Second, the party must 
demonstrate that the disregard led to the destruction 
of the parent-child relationship.'1 (4) Id: Wulffenstein, 
560 P.2d at 334. Both of these elements must be 
proven by clear and convincing evidence. See Santokly vs. 
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1403, 
71 L.Ed 2d 599 (1982); In re J. Children, 664 P.2d 
1158, 1159 (Utah 1983). 
Then in Footnote #4, at the bottom of page 477 of the 
prior Appeal, this Court stated: 
#4. Concern for the child's best interest is manifested 
in the second prong of the Wulffenstein abandonment test, 
there is a strong presumption that a child is better 
off in the care of his natural parents, or at least 
having some relationship with its natural parents, and 
absent clear and convincing evidence that the parentfs 
disregard for his or her obligations caused a destruction 
of the parenti-child relationship, the presumption against 
termination will govern. See In re J.P. 648 P.2d 1365, 
1377 (Ufcah 1982); In re Gastello, 632 P. 2d 855, 856-57 
(Utah 1981); State ex rel. M.W.H. vs Aguilar, 794 P. 2d 
27, 29 (Utah App 1990). (Emphasis original) 
As a result, Appellant submits that there clearly is a 
presumption that the child is better off, not being terminated 
from his Father1, and that to beat the presumption, the Mother 
would have had to establish by clear and convincing evidence 
that the Father's conduct led to the destruction of the parent 
child relationship. 
At the outset of this argument, it is critical for the 
Court of Appeals to know, once again, that the Mather has no 
knowledge of the facts surrounding the Fatherfs contact and 
the Father's conduct, once the child is picked up by the 
Child's Paternal Grandparents for visitation. Note the 
transcript at pages 105 and 106. 
As noted in the transcript at page 536 and following the 
critical downfall . of the failing relationship between 
the parties, occured when the Appellant came home during lunch 
unexpectedly, and found his wife Kim Fazzio, in the shower x*ith 
a Mr. Mark Woodward. 
After the Fazziofs marriage was annulled, Kim Fazzio, 
married the same Mark Woodward, and the r&ncor between the 
parents of R.A.F. was almost beyond control. 
Wisely the Paternal Grandparents stepped in between the 
hostile factions, and picked up and delivered the child from 
the time that Cameron stppped to the time that the Mother 
terminated all visitation, pursuant to Exhibit #4. (T-78). 
As the Court can see from the undisputed event, 
surrounding the March, 1990, Christmas; celebration, and the 
memorable gifts privided the child by his Father, Cameron, 
which the Mother and Mark Woodward, forceably prevented the child 
from receiving , as noted on page 292 of the transcript, there 
was an overt effort to destroy the parent-child relationship 
of the Father and his Child, by the Mother and her family. 
The various statements by the Mother on Direct Examination, 
that the Father had not given the child any gifts whatsoever 
and never remembered the child on special .days like birthdays 
and Christmas, etc., which she fully recanted on Cross-examination 
when faced with the many toys, puzzles, articles of clothing 
and the blow ups of various pictures reflecting special times 
of a Father with his son, speak volumes of how this Mother would 
go to whatever means available to terminate the Father's rights 
involving this Child. 
After all, the Mother firmly maintained her position in 
Court about the relationship, until she was faced with the actual 
physical evidence produced in open court, the existence of which 
she could not deny. 
On page 67 of the transcript on direct examination, 
she stated, without any hesitation whatsoever: 
Did he ever buy any c l o t h e s for R.A.F.? 
No, si ir . 
Any toys or anything? 
No, sir. 
On the boy's birthday and Christmas, did he give 
the boy any presents? 
No, sir. 
However, when sitting on the witness stand, and looking 
right at the gifts, and right at the pictures, etc., she then 
changes her story to say that she has no personal knowledge of 
the clothes that the Father provided his son, and the toys 
that the Father provided his son nor the times and special 
events that were remembered by the Father with very meaningful 
gifts to his son. Note the transcript at page 109 and following. 
Appellant submits that the level of hostility is merely 
hinted at by these references to Christmas in March, refusing 
to allow the child to keep his gifts from his Father and his 
Father's family, and all of the visitation with the minor 
child that was denied by the Mother, which required that the 
Appellant literally obtain a Court order to be with his son, 
Appellant submits that there can be no question as 
to what the Mother attempted to do in reference to a destruction 
of the parent-child relationship, between the Father and his son. 
However, the question that this Court must address is 
what if anything, did the Father do in reference to an alleged 
destruction of the parent-child relationship between this Father 
and his son. 
As noted above in the prior Appeal at page 477, there 
must be established by clear and confincing evidence that the 
alleged disregard of the Father led to the destruction of the 
parent-child relationship. 
The Child was born on September 17, 1986, some three 
months before the parents even married, (T-19) and before the 
child could even focus on life, the Father was out of the home.(T-30). 
Contact and visitation between the Father and his son 
was ffas the parties can agree." 
According to the Mother, she sought out an attorney, 
on how she could totally cut off the Father's rights involving 
the child, and then systematically followed the attorney's 
instructions, by cutting off completely the Child's contact with 
the Father and the Father's family. 
Everyone agreed, it took a Court order to force the 
Mother to allow the Father and his family to be with the child, 
and that based upon that Court order, the Father at least in 
1990, is spending Christmas with his child in March. 
Still where is the evidence, and where is the FINDING 
OF FACT, that shows sufficient underlying detail, where the 
Father's conduct led to a destruction of the parent-child 
relationship. 
In 1989, when the Petition filed by the Appellant to 
spell out specific visitation the Child had just turned three 
years of age. He could, of course, walk and was potter trained, 
and his vocabulary was on the increase significantly. 
However, the infant could hardly percieve what was 
really going on in life. 
At three years of age, the child knows about candy, 
and toys and surprises, etc., but what would a three year old 
know about child support and acknowledgments of paternity, etc? 
Futhermore, even assuming that the child is exceptionally 
precocious, and would be versed in the legal aspects of the same 
at three years of age, who would have told the child about the 
same, as according to the Mother, the Father is having no contact 
with the child, and there was no evidence that the Paternal 
Grandparents were engaging in this level of dialogue with the 
infant, even assuming they would belittle their own son in front 
of their grandson. 
Where is there any basis to establish even a hint, let 
alone by clear and convincing evidence, that the Father's 
conduct led to a destruction of the parent-child relationship? 
Even if one were to assume, as the lower Court did, 
that no child support was paid, how would the child learn of 
Surely the Mother was getting more through public 
assistance than she would have had if the Appellant paid 
his $100.00 per month on time and consistently, so the child 
is not going without or having to;.mkke it in life on less money 
per month, whether Appellant pays or not. 
Kence, the infant was not facing an empty bowl of cereal, 
wherein the Child would be exposed to going without, because 
the Mlow life Father did not pay this month, so we have nothing 
to eat.11 
The Mother was better off on public assistance than 
she was on his $100.00 per month. 
Kence, the infant would have no exposure to the payment 
of child support and whether Cameron paid his money or not, and 
this perhaps is highlighted by the fact that even the Child's 
Mother does not know if Cameron has been paying his $100.00 
per month to Recovery Services. (Note the transcript at page 122). 
It is interesting to note however, that the infant would 
know some things, like what was his name,,and others around 
him that would have parts of the names reflected as R.A.F., as 
their own names. 
So there would have been some perception by this three 
year old of who's who, etc. 
Yet, where is the evidence, that shows the Father's 
conduct leading to a destruction of the parent child relationship. 
Lastly, where is the FINDING OF FACT, with sufficient 
underlying detail, or any detail whatsoever, establishing that 
Appellant submits that there is no evidence, in fact 
there is not a hint, as to hotf this Father allegedly destroyed 
his parent-child relationship with this three year old. 
The evidence on the otherhand, to sustain this FINDING, 
must be to the level of clear and convincing evidence, the 
standard of proof just below that afforded those charged with 
criminal activity, ie: beyond a reasonable doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
This case involves perhaps, the most important of all 
of lifefs issues - a relationship between a Father and his 
infant son. 
The burden of proof ought to be beyond a reasonable doubt 
as the impacts on peoples lives is more often than not, far more 
grave than a fine or time in jail. 
Here is a case involving a Father's contact with a 
three year old child - a child that bears his own name, and the 
name of a favorite uncle of the Father. 
This is no "run of the mill" abandonment case, as in 
this case the Mother admits that she went to an attorney to see 
how she could cut off the Father from his rights involving the 
infant boy. She testified that the attorney told her that she 
had to go a whole year without any contact. 
As noted in the first exhibic attached hereto, she prepared 
a letter and delivered it to the Fatherfs parents, doing just 
exactly as instructed by her attorney - no visitation at all. 
Immediately, thereafter, the Father Petitions the 
Court for specific visitation, instead of the arrangement involving, 
"as the parties can agree.11 
The Mother responds to the request for meaningful contact, 
with a Petition to Terminate Parental Rights. 
This is not a case of credibility, as the Mother's own 
testimony supports the bottomline conclusion, that it literally 
took a court order for the Father to be with his son. 
She testified that they took the gifts of the Father away 
from the child, and refused to let the child have the same in her 
home. 
She stated that she had no knowledge of the gifts, etc., 
given to the Child by his Father, and yet the lower Court has taken 
this "no knowledge" and concluded by a '.'clear and convincing 
standard" that the Father abandoned his son. 
This Court has already held in the prior appeal, that there 
must be clear and convincing evidence of how the Father's conduct 
led to a destruction of the parent-child relationship. 
There are no findings and frankly no evidence to support 
this determination, as the child was but an infant, had just 
turned three years of age the month before the Father petitioned 
for specific visitation. 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court carefully 
review this most critical part of life itself, ie: his family, 
and then reverse and remand this matter once again to the Court, 
with instructions to set out meaningful visitation jyJth the Father, 
Dated this /V ^ 3ay of March, 1993, 
/ teA^L-
JOHR/WALSH 
ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing: BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT, to 
the Plaintiff, by mailing the same in the United States Mails, 
addressed to: LARRY KELLER, ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFF, 
257 TOWERS, SUITE 340, 257 EAST 200 SOUTH - 10, SALT LAKE CITY, 
UTAH, 84111, this ay of March, 1993. 
ADDENDUll 
I've been meaning to say this for a long time but after 
yesterday's experience I think it is best that I don't bring Tony 
down until Mark comes back to town. I feel this way for several 
reasons. The first being, the way you treat me as a person. You 
act like I owe you the visits to Tony. Dick especially doesn't 
miss a chance to yell and this intimidates me and brings back the 
same feelings of fear that Cameron used to cause me. I don't 
deserve this. I have been a good mother and you don't have any 
right to treat me this way. 
Secondly: the way Michelle was treated. She was an innocent 
person trying to do you a favor and you treated her very 
harshly. It makes me mad to hear thajb Dick said " She (meaning 
ine) always does this and she should get her act together" because 
I have always bent over backwards to let you see Tony. Even my 
owiLjjarents did not have him over the weekend every other week 
n^rj^your parents get your kids every other weekT] x am not 
responsible to take Chris to Darren's parents nor am I 
resppnsible.J;cufcake Tony to Cameron's parents. 
I have been doing this for you out of kindness because I realize 
Cameron didn't bring him over. 
Thirdly: I don't like the way you question other people about 
what I am doing. It is none of your business. I told you a 
while back that I would let you see Tony when I was in town and 
you don't need to hassel my family and friends. 
As you know, I am leaving soon and I am not sure when I will be 
back but when both Mark and I are back we will bring Tony to see 
you. 
Kim 
S)J?^~ 
EXHIBIT A 
EXHIBIT A 
djitft ©isirict HTubenile Court 
Judge Arthur G. Chnstean 
Judge Olof A. Johansson 
Judge Franklyn B. Matheson 
Judge Sharon P. McCully 
Richard W. Birrell 
Court Commissioner 
Roy W. Whitehouse 
Court Executive 
January 24, 1992 
John Walsh 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 202 Cove Point Plaza 
3865 South Wasatch Boulevard 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 Re: Woodward v. Fazzio, 
Case No. 900626-CA 
Dear Mr. Walsh: 
The Court has received a remand of the above case for more specific 
factual findings as it relates to paragraphs 7, 8, 10 and 11 of this Court's 
findings. I, therefore, invite you, but you are not required, to submit 
proposed written findings consistent with the request of the Court of Appeals. 
Such findings should be provided to this Court no later than February 28, 
1992. If additional time is necessary, please advise me. 
Respectfully, 
Hon.^ eflof 
3522 South 700 West / Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 / 801-265-5900 / FAX 801-265-5936 
EXHIBIT B 
EXHIBIT B 
LARRY R. KELLER, #1785 
Attorney for Petitioner 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEREST : 
PROPOSED ADDITIONAL FINDINGS 
OF : OF FACT 
RICHARD ANTHONY FAZZIO, : Case No. 786412 
DOB: September 17, 1986 
: Judge Olof A. Johansson 
KIM (FAZZIO) WOODWARD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
RICHARD CAMERON FAZZIO, 
Respondent. 
Comes now Petitioner, Kim (Fazzio) Woodward, and proposes the 
following additional Findings of Fact to be made by the Honorable 
Olof A. Johansson pursuant to the remand of the above-entitled 
matter by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
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I. ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 7. 
Petitioner would begin by recommending to the Court that it 
amend paragraph 7 to begin as follows: 
M7. Although there was disputed evidence 
admitted during the course of the trial, the 
Court finds the following facts by clear and 
convincing evidence to be believable: 
a. Respondent admitted that he urged Peti-
tioner to get an abortion when he first 
learned she was pregnant with R.A.F. Respon-
dent urged Petitioner to get an abortion on 
more than one occasion (T. 20, 21, 585, 586). 
b. Respondent was never a parent to R.A.F. 
from the time he was born. He refused to 
babysit the child, even though he was not 
working most of the time during the parties' 
marriage. Respondent played no part in the 
care or nurturing of R.A.F. during the one-
year marriage. Respondent would not get up at 
night with the child, would not change a dia-
per, and would not feed a bottle (T. 23, 24, 
25). 
c. Respondent refused to take financial 
responsibility for R.A.F. during the course of 
the marriage, and never gave her any money for 
the child in any way. His refusal to help 
support R.A.F. resulted in the child being 
required to wear second-hand items and lacking 
some of the necessities of life (T. 29, 30). 
d. After the parties separated for the last 
time, Petitioner spoke to Respondent many 
times about needing money and child support, 
and he refused to give her anything whatso-
ever as child support (T. 30). 
e. Respondent never purchased presents or 
items for the child during the course of the 
marriage, and Petitioner testified she never 
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observed him purchase anything for the child 
after the marriage (T. 30). 
f • Respondent did not •love or nurture 
R.A.F. during the time of the marriage in any 
way (T. 30). 
g. On one occasion, Respondent grabbed 
Petitioner by the hair and had her on the 
floor and was beating her head into the floor 
when she started calling for Christopher (her 
son from a prior marriage) to run over to the 
neighbors and have them call the police. As 
soon as he moved, Respondent said f(I)f any-
body moves off that couch, I'll kill her.1 
R.A.F. was one of the two children present on 
the couch observing this physical abuse to his 
mother and the threat to kill her. Both 
R.A.F. and Christopher were terrified and they 
were taken by the police to the YWCA after 
this incident (T. 42, 43, 44). 
h. Petitioner received absolutely no child 
support from Respondent and she tried con-
stantly to locate him, but was unable to. 
Even though Respondent's parents, Richard and 
Steffany Fazzio, lived at the same address 
during this entire period of time, they would 
refuse to tell her Respondent's address so 
that she might collect child support from him. 
Every time Petitioner saw Respondent, she 
asked him for child support and he would 
always refuse to give it to her (T. 71, 72, 
73, 74). 
i. Although Respondent came around four or 
five times from the date of their last separa-
tion in September of 1987 through September of 
1988, he spent very little time with R.A.F. 
After September of 1988, Respondent never came 
to see the child at all, nor telephoned, nor 
contacted the child in any way (T. 75, 76, 77, 
78). 
j. Petitioner would allow Respondent's par-
ents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, to see the 
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child occasionally between September of 1988 
and October of 1989 as they requested. Howev-
er , after the visitations with Respondent's 
parents, Petitioner would always ask R.A.F. if 
he had seen Respondent during the visitations, 
and R.A.F. would say fnof (T. 82, 83). 
k. Although Richard and Steffany Fazzio, 
the paternal grandparents, testified that they 
visited with the child on occasion between 
September of 1988 and October 1989; and al-
though the paternal grandparents claimed that 
Respondent was present during some of these 
grandparent visitation periods, the father's 
testimony in this regard was directly im-
peached and the Court finds his testimony 
unreliable, untrustworthy and unbelievable. 
1. The grandparents' testimony in regard to 
their son's visitations seemed unreliable and 
unbelievable in light of their own great 
interest in maintaining contact with R.A.F., 
and in light of the fact that their testimony 
was impeached on several occasions. For 
instance, the grandparents' willingness to 
exaggerate and stretch the truth regarding 
their son's contact with the child was shown 
by their testimony regarding the court-ordered 
visitation occurring between March and the 
time of the trial in the instant case in 
August 1990. While suggesting that Petitioner 
was hard to find, Mrs. Fazzio admitted that 
Petitioner brought the child to her and her 
husband for visitation for approximately one 
year (T. 340, 348, 349, 351). Furthermore, 
Mrs. Fazzio admitted on cross-examination that 
she really did not know when Respondent did or 
did not see R.A.F. (T. 352). Mrs. Fazzio 
admitted that she and her husband were paying 
the attorney's fees for the instant action and 
not Respondent (T. 350). 
m. Although Mrs. Fazzio testified that she 
and her husband had submitted child support 
payments to Petitioner once this termination 
action was filed, she claims it was on behalf 
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of Respondent; however, she admitted Respon-
dent only reimbursed her for three of the nine 
checks she claimed to have sent to Petitioner 
(T. 322). Furthermore, Mrs* Fazzio admitted 
that no offers were made to pay the child 
support to Petitioner until this termination 
action was filed on January 26, 1990, by 
Petitioner (T. 354). 
n. Mrs. Fazzio did testify that some toys 
were purchased for the child by Respondent, 
but in light of the fact she testified her son 
did not pay child support because he had been 
unemployed and his earnings were low, her 
testimony was unreliable and the Court be-
lieves it was the paternal grandparents who 
were thoughtful enough to purchase the few 
toys in question for R.A.F. (T. 318). 
o. Mrs. Fazzio admitted that she never con-
cerned herself with whether or not Petitioner 
had enough money to meet the basic needs of 
R.A.F., her grandson (T. 320, 321). Mrs. 
Fazzio suggested this was because she felt it 
was fa matter between Kim and Cameron. . . 
(A)nd I did not know he was not providing for 
her. I had no need to do (sic know) that.1 
(T. 321). Despite this testimony, on at least 
two different occasions during Petitioner's 
attorney's cross-examination of her, Mrs. 
Fazzio admitted that she knew Respondent was 
not paying child support to Petitioner, making 
her testimony less credible (T. 318). 
p. Further testimony showing the unreli-
ability and unbelievability of the testimony 
of the paternal grandparents came during 
cross-examination involving court-ordered 
visitation commenced in June of 1990 after the 
instant actions were filed. Mrs. Fazzio 
admitted that she was aware that visitation 
with R.A.F. was to be at the residence of she 
and her husband by court order (T. 373). Upon 
cross-examination, she admitted that on one 
occasion she and her husband left Salt Lake 
City with a boat attached to their truck, but 
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dropped off the boat prior to picking up 
R.A.F. at Petitioner's residence. She admit-
ted that after picking up R.A.F., she and her 
husband went back and picked up the boat and 
went boating on Echo Reservoir with R.A.F., 
completely unbeknownst to Petitioner (T. 399, 
400). Mrs. Fazzio then stated, apparently 
seriously, that her boat was her home and so 
she didn't feel that she and her husband were 
violating Commissioner Peuler's (and Judge 
Wilkinson's) Order that visitation be at their 
residence (T. 400). She indicated that '. . . 
summer weekends, our boat is our home. . . 
It's an overnight boat, it has cooking and 
sleeping facilities, and we live in it week-
ends. ' (T. 400). However, when Mrs. Fazzio 
was asked how many weekends they had slept 
overnight on the boat that year, 1990, through 
August 17 (the day of the trial), she admitted 
that they had not slept on the boat once that 
year (T. 400). 
q. Richard Bruce Fazzio, the paternal 
grandfather, agreed with his wife that his 
boat was his personal residence and their 
exercising visitation in June of 1990 by 
taking the child boating rather than to their 
home in Salt Lake City was not a violation of 
the District Court's Order (T. 468). Such 
testimony shows the incredulity and unbeliev-
ability of the paternal grandparents, Steffany 
Fazzio and Richard Bruce Fazzio. 
r. Respondent never provided R.A.F. with a 
gift on his birthday or for Christmas (T. 79, 
80). 
s. Petitioner gave Respondent's parents a 
note in October of 1989 indicating that she 
was going on vacation and she would allow them 
to see the child later. It was immediately 
after receiving this note at a time of ex-
pected visitation, that Mr. and Mrs. Fazzio 
retained an attorney and filed the Petition 
for Modification on behalf of their son, the 
Respondent (T. 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81). The 
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Court believes that the fact is the instant 
action was filed only as a response to Respon-
dent fs parents' concern about their own visi-
tation with the child, and not their son's. 
t. R.A.F. believes his dad is Petitioner's 
present husband, Mark Woodward (T. 83). This 
could only be true if he simply did not know 
who his biological father was as a result of 
his biological father's failure to make any 
serious efforts to visit with him. 
u. Petitioner allowed court-ordered visita-
tion when requested between March of 1990 and 
the time of trial in this matter (August 
1990); although there were only three occa-
sions when Respondent took advantage of the 
opportunity to visit the child during this 
period of time. After one of these visita-
tions, R.A.F. exclaimed to Petitioner 'Mom, 
Cameron told me he's my dad. He's not my 
dad. ' On another occasion after a court-
ordered visitation, R.A.F. was asked by Peti-
tioner who Cameron (Respondent) was, and he 
would say that he was Brian's brother; and 
when asked by Petitioner who his dad was, he 
would always say 'Mark' (R.A.F.'s stepfather) 
(T. 88). 
v. Witnesses Barbara Kresser and Ken 
Kresser, the parents of R.A.F.fs stepfather, 
Mark Woodward, testified that R.A.F. has never 
mentioned Respondent or anything about his 
natural father, and that contrary to the 
claims of the Respondent, R.A.F. has not been 
taught anything by the family with regard to 
who his father is, that it is just a natural 
relationship and a happy family (T. 138). 
w. The Court finds that rather than Peti-
tioner's movements from different residences 
being the cause of Respondent's failure to 
visit with the child, Respondent failed to 
have contact with the child to avoid paying 
child support. On one occasion, Christy 
Tinnin, Petitioner's sister, testified she 
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accidentally ran into Respondent at a truck 
stop in February of 1989 at a time when she 
was aware Petitioner was looking for him to 
get him to pay child support.* Respondent said 
to Ms. Tinnin during that conversation ' . . . 
do me a favor and don't tell Kim you saw me, 
because I am supposed to be in Nevada. ' (T. 
182, 183). 
x. Even though Respondent was provided with 
court-ordered visitation after the filing of 
the instant lawsuit, he did not make an effort 
to spend much time with the child during the 
court-ordered visitations. Ken Kresser, the 
husband of Barbara Kresser and step-father of 
Mark Woodward and Petitioner's present hus-
band, testified that after the May 1990 court-
ordered visitation with Respondent, he asked 
R.A.F. about the visitation. R.A.F. replied 
that he had gone to the park. When Mr. 
Kresser asked him if Cameron (Respondent) was 
there with him, R.A.F. stated 'no, he was 
sleeping.' (T. 173). 
II. PROPOSED CHANGES IN FINDING OF FACT NO. 8 
a. The testimony was clear at the trial 
that Respondent had never personally paid a 
single penny of child support to Petitioner, 
and that some $3,000.00 in back child support 
was owed at the time of trial in this matter 
(T. 71, 72; T. 362, 363). 
b. Petitioner made significant efforts to 
contact Respondent to get him to pay child 
support and was regularly informed by Respon-
dent's parents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, 
that they did not know how to contact Respon-
dent and could not give her an address or 
telephone number for him (T. 71, 72). This 
Court finds it unbelievable that Mr. and Mrs. 
Fazzio never knew where their son was so as to 
allow Petitioner to contact him for purposes 
of obtaining her court-ordered child support. 
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c. Only after Petitioner filed her Petition 
for Termination of Parental Rights did she 
receive any checks from anyone regarding child 
support. She did receive certain checks from 
the grandparents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, 
at that time, supposedly on behalf of Respon-
dent, but her attorney advised her to return 
those checks (T. 133). The evidence is uncon-
troverted that no monies were ever submitted 
to Petitioner on a checking account with 
Respondent's name on it. Nor was there any 
evidence that Respondent had provided any 
money to Petitioner of any kind. 
d. After numerous incidents of abuse, Peti-
tioner retained a lawyer and asked Respondent 
to accompany her to the lawyer's office to 
sign some papers, one provision of which would 
require him to pay child support. Due to the 
existence of this provision, Respondent became 
angry and tore up the paper, although he later 
signed it (T. 63, 64, 65). 
e. Respondent's testimony regarding efforts 
to pay child support was inherently unbeliev-
able, untrustworthy and unreliable. Examples 
from the record as to Respondent's unbeliev-
ability are follows: 
1. Respondent claimed to have 
provided a car worth $600.00 to 
Petitioner in lieu of two months 
child support (T. 564, 565). Howev-
er, rebuttal witness Scott Ortar 
testified that in fact Respondent 
sold the car in question to Sommers 
Auto Wrecking approximately three 
months after the parties' marriage 
was annulled for $75.00 (T. 475-
482). Respondent admitted on cross-
examination that he indeed sold the 
very same vehicle he claimed to have 
given Petitioner in lieu of child 
support to Sommers Auto Wrecking for 
$75.00; and further admitted that he 
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did not give the $75.00 to Petition-
er (T. 571, 572, 573, 574). 
2. Related to, but in addition to 
the foregoing regarding the car, 
Respondent testified on direct exam-
ination he did not give Petitioner 
title to the 1979 Mercury he was 
providing her in lieu of child sup-
port after the annulment, because he 
did not have the title. Despite 
this clear testimony by Respondent, 
Petitioner introduced at trial 
Exhibit 7 which is a Utah Certifi-
cate of Title to the 1979 Mercury in 
question and related documents. 
This exhibit clearly showed that the 
Utah Certificate of Title was issued 
in the name of Respondent, and was 
never in the name of Petitioner. 
Furthermore, this exhibit showed 
that Respondent signed the document 
as "transferor" before a notary 
public on February 5, 1988. This 
was the very date of the check in-
troduced as Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 
made out to Respondent from Sommers 
Auto Wrecking. Moreover, the VIN 
number of the vehicle on the Certif-
icate of Title and the check made 
out to Richard D. Fazzio from 
Sommers Auto Wrecking are exactly 
the same, and clearly establish that 
this was the same vehicle Respondent 
claimed to have given Petitioner in 
lieu of child support. When con-
fronted with the title to the car 
and the check from Sommers Wrecking 
on cross-examination by Petitioner's 
attorney, Respondent testified he 
wished to changed his testimony 
about not having the title to the 
vehicle and giving it to Petitioner 
in lieu of child support (T. 564, 
571). 
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3. Pursuant to the Decree of 
Annulment issued by the Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson in Civil No. 
D-87-3798 on November- 19, 1987, 
Petitioner alone was entitled to 
claim R.A.F. as a dependent on her 
income tax return (Decree of Annul-
ment paragraph 2). 
4. Although Respondent had stated 
on cross-examination that he had 
always been truthful with government 
agencies, Petitioner's attorney on 
cross-examination showed Respondent 
Exhibit 8 which is Respondent's 1987 
Tax Return. Petitioner's attorney 
asked Respondent if everything re-
ported on his 1987 Tax Return was 
true, and Respondent replied it was. 
Yet he claimed R.A.F. as a deduction 
in violation of the Decree of Annul-
ment despite his failure to pay a 
single cent in child support (T. 
580). 
5. On cross-examination, Respon-
dent was shown Petitioner's Exhibit 
9 which was Respondent's 1988 Income 
Tax Return. Respondent admitted he 
paid no child support for 1988, but 
that the tax return showed that he 
was claiming R.A.F. as a dependent 
stating to the IRS that R.A.F. had 
lived in Respondent's home six 
months during 1988. Respondent 
admitted that that was not true and 
that he had apparently made a mis-
take in believing that his son, 
R.A.F., had lived in his home for 
six months in 1988 when he was liv-
ing in Wyoming, Nevada and with his 
grandmother in Salt Lake City (T. 
581, 582). 
6. The false statements made to 
the federal government on the income 
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tax return claiming R.A.F. as a 
dependent under circumstances where 
he did not pay a single penny of 
child support made Respondent's 
testimony incredible and unbeliev-
able. 
III. PROPOSED CHANGES IN FINDING OF FACT NO. 10 
a. Darren Holt, Petitioner's husband from 
a prior marriage, and the father of Petition-
er's child Darren Christopher Holt, received 
notice in approximately December of 1986 from 
the Department of Recovery Services stating he 
was responsible for child support for R.A.F. 
Mr. Holt testified that he approached Respon-
dent numerous times regarding this situation 
and asked him to submit to tests or sign a 
legal document admitting to the paternity of 
R.A.F. Respondent steadfastly refused to ever 
sign a document with the Department of Recov-
ery Services acknowledging his paternity of 
R.A.F. Mr. Holt contacted Respondent some 14 
or 15 times attempting to get him to admit to 
his paternity of R.A.F. with the State and 
Respondent consistently refused (T. 146, 147, 
148, 149, 150, 151, 591, 592). 
b. Although Respondent claimed he had 
signed a document upon the birth of R.A.F. 
acknowledging paternity, Respondent was unable 
to provide a copy of any document, or even an 
identification of a document he had signed 
acknowledging paternity when challenged to do 
so at trial by Petitioner's counsel (T. 590, 
591). The result of Respondent's failure to 
acknowledge the paternity of R.A.F. to the 
State of Utah was that Darren Holt paid pay-
ments to the State of Utah's Department of 
Recovery Services on behalf of R.A.F., an 
obligation that was rightfully that of Respon-
dent. 
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IV. PROPOSED CHANGES TO FINDING OF FACT NO. 11 
a. Petitioner had a child from a previous 
marriage, Darren Christopher Holt (DOB: 2/13/83), 
who lived with Petitioner at the time she was 
married to Respondent. Christopher was approximate-
ly four years old during that period (T. 28). 
b. During the course of the marriage, she 
and her children, including R.A.F., were 
regularly subjected to mental and physical 
threats and abuse by Respondent (T. 22, 23, 
32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 
46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 55, 56, 151, 153, 
154, 155, 158, 183, 184, 189, 190, 191). 
c. Respondent admitted during the course of 
the marriage that he "smacked Kim" and that he 
did not make sure that either R.A.F. or the 
child Christopher were out of the room when he 
slapped her (T. 598). 
d. Petitioner talked Respondent into seek-
ing marriage counseling during the marriage; 
but not only did his abuse of her not change, 
Respondent actually beat her the day of coun-
seling because he didn't like the things she 
said to the counselor (T. 21, 22, 23). 
e. Darren Holt testified that his son, 
Christopher, told him during his visitations 
that he was terrified of Respondent, and that 
Respondent had threatened him (Christopher) 
with a knife and hit him a number of times. 
Mr. Holt also testified Christopher told him 
Respondent at one point drove Petitioner and 
Christopher out of Petitioner's home with a 
gun and told them that if they came back, he 
(Respondent) would kill them. (T. 151, 152, 
153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158). This testimony 
was corroborated by Petitioner. 
f. When Mr. Holt confronted Respondent 
about this abuse of his son, Christopher, 
Respondent replied "... while Christopher is 
in my house, I will treat him the way I want." 
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(T. 154, 155). This testimony was corrobo-
rated by Petitioner who described Respondent's 
attitude toward Christopher as "mean and 
hateful . . . cruel. . ." (T. 32). 
g. Respondent admitted he tried to commit 
suicide on at least one occasion during the 
marriage (T. 595, 596). 
h. On one occasion, Respondent grabbed 
Petitioner by the hair and had her on the 
floor and was beating her head into the floor 
when she started calling for Christopher to 
run over to the neighbors and have them call 
the police. Petitioner testified that as soon 
as Christopher moved, Respondent said "(I)f 
anybody moves off that couch, I'll kill her." 
R.A.F. was one of the two children present on 
the couch observing this physical abuse to his 
mother and the threat to kill her. Both 
R.A.F. and Christopher were terrified and they 
were taken by the police to the YWCA after 
this incident (T. 42, 43, 44). 
CONCLUSION 
While two of the three Judges on the Court of Appeals hearing 
the instant matter on appeal, seemed concerned about this Court's 
final decision, it is Petitioner's belief that if the Court 
provides the Findings of Fact, clearly supported by the record, 
which have been proposed in the instant document, the Court of 
Appeals will have a better understanding as to the nature of this 
case and the reasons for this Court's decision. 
As Petitioner argued in her brief on appeal: 
"Never has a case more clearly demonstrated 
why it is essential for an appellate court to 
defer to the juvenile court on findings of 
fact than the instant case. It is the posi-
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tion of Appellee (Petitioner) that Appellant 
(Respondent) stated numerous falsehoods and 
committed perjury during his testimony in the 
trial court. This was demonstrated through 
cross-examination, rebuttal witnesses and 
evidence which could not be overcome by Ap-
pellant (Respondent). Furthermore, Appellee 
(Petitioner) maintains that the physical 
manner in which the Appellant (Respondent) and 
his witnesses testified in this case was as 
important as the words they used in determin-
ing their credibility. The trial judge alone 
was in a position to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses and his determination should not 
be disturbed by this Court without a demon-
stration by Appellant (Respondent) that the 
Findings are against the weight of the evi-
dence and thus clearly erroneous. State in 
Interest of P.H. and M.H. v. Harrison, 783 
P.2d 565, 570 (Utah App. 1989)." 
Petitioner/Appellee1s Brief at 21. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of February, 1992. 
Attorney/ for Petitioner 
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EXHIBIT C 
Cftrtr Bistrict Jufeenfie Court 
Judge Arthur G. Christean 
Judge Olof A. Johansson 
Judge Franklyn B. Matheson 
Judge Sharon P. McCully 
A p r i l 3 0 , 1992 
Richard W. Birrell 
Court Commissioner 
RoyW.Whitehouse 
Court Executive 
Mr. John Walsh 
2319 South Foothill Drive, Suite 270 
Salt Lake City, Utah K43 09 
RE: Woodward v. Fazzio 
Case No. 900626-CA 
Juvenile Court Case No. 786512 
Do not give up hope. I am making serious attempts at providing more 
detailed findings in the above case, in between my regular caseload. 
Each of your briefs are extremely well done and very helpful. I thank 
you for them. 
Respectfully, 
cc: file 
3522 South 700 West / Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 / 801-265-5900 
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..* THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE CL .£ 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
.J C3 fc_i* — 
JUN 1 5 1992 
STATE OF UTAH, in the Interest 
of 
FAZZIO, RICHARD ANTHONY 
(09/17/86) 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT *>crr~ 
JUVENILE COURT ju-'w -"t 
Case No,: 786412 
WOODWARD, KIM (FAZZIO) 
vs. 
FAZZIO, RICHARD CAMERON 
- Petitioner 
- Respondent : 
ORDER 
: DISTRICT COURT 
i Case No: 87-37986 
Upon remand from the Utah Court of Appeals this Court submits the 
following supplemental and amended detailed findings in support of its order 
entered on November 28, 1990. 
Paragraph 7. Although there was disputed evidence admitted during the 
course of the trial, the Court finds the following facts by clear and 
convincing evidence to be believable: 
a. Respondent admitted that he urged Petitioner to get an abortion 
when he first learned she was pregnant with R.A.F.. Respondent urged 
Petitioner to get an abortion on more than one occasion; 
b. Respondent did not actively participate in the parenting of R.A.F. 
from the time he was born. He refused to babysit the child, even though 
he was not working most of the time during the parties' marriage. 
Respondent would not get up at night with the child, would not change a 
diaper, and would not bottle feed the child; 
c. Respondent refused to take financial responsibility for R.A.F., 
during the course of the marriage and never gave her any money for the 
child, except as mentioned in paragraph (m); 
d. After the parties separated for the last time, Petitioner spoke to 
Respondent many times about needing money and child support, and he 
refused to give her any child support; 
e. On one occasion. Respondent grabbed Petitioner by the hair and had 
her on the floor and was beating her head into the floor when she 
started calling for Christopher (her son from a prior marriage) to run 
over to the neighbors and have them call the police. As soon as he 
moved, Respondent said'(I)£ anybody moves off that couch, I'll kill 
her.' R.A.F. was one of the two children present on the couch observing 
this physical abuse to his mother and the threat to kill her. Both 
R.A.F. and Christopher were terrified and they were taken to the police 
to the YWCA after this incident; 
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f. Petitioner received no child support from Respondent and she tried 
constantly to locate him, but was unable. Even though Respondent's 
parents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, lived at the same address during 
this entire period of time, they would refuse to tell her Respondent's 
address. When Petitioner saw Respondent, she asked him for child 
support and he refused to give it to her; 
g. Although Respondent came around four or five times from the date of 
their separation in September of 1987, through September of 1988, he 
spent very little time with R.A.F.. After September of 1988, 
Respondent never came to see the child nor telephone, nor contacted the 
child; 
h. Petitioner would allow respondent's parents, Richard and Steffany 
Fazzio, to see the child occasionally between September of 1988 and 
October of 1989, as they requested. However, after the visitations 
with Respondent's parents, Petitioner would always ask R.A.F., if he 
had seen Respondent during the visitations, and R.A.F., would say "no"; 
i. Although Richard and Steffany Fazzio, the paternal grandparents, 
testified that they visited with the child on occasion between 
September of 1988 and October 1989, and although the paternal 
grandparents claimed that Respondent was present during some of these 
grandparent visitation periods, the father's testimony in this regard 
was directly impeached and the Court finds his testimony unreliable, 
untrustworthy and unbelievable; 
j. The grandparents' testimony in regard to their son's visitations 
seemed unreliable and unbelievable in light of their own great interest 
in maintaining contact with R.A.F., and in light of the fact that their 
testimony was impeached on several occasions. For instance, the 
grandparents' willingness to exaggerate the truth regarding their son's 
contact with the child was shown by their testimony regarding the 
court-ordered visitation occurring between March and the time of the 
trial in the instant case in August 1990. While suggesting that 
Petitioner was hard to find, Mrs. Fazzio admitted that Petitioner 
brought the child to her and her husband for visitation for 
approximately one year. Furthermore, Mrs. Fazzio admitted on 
cross-examination that she really did not know when Respondent did or 
did not see R.A.F.. Mrs. Fazzio admitted that she and her husband were 
paying the attorney's fees for the instant action and not Respondent; 
k. Although Mrs. Fazzio testified that she and her husband had 
submitted child support payments to Petitioner once this termination 
action was filed, she claims it was on behalf of Respondent; however, 
she admitted Respondent only reimbursed her for three of the nine 
checks she claimed to have sent to Petitioner. Furthermore, Mrs. 
Fazzio admitted that no offers were made to pay the child support to 
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Petitioner until this termination action was filed on January 26, 1990, 
by Petitioner; 
1. Mrs. Fazzio did testify that some toys were purchased for the child 
by Respondent, but in light of the fact she testified her son did not 
pay child support because he had been unemployed and his earnings were 
low, her testimony was unreliable and the Court believes it was the 
paternal grandparents who were thoughtful enough to purchase the few 
toys in question for R.A.F.; 
m. Mrs. Fazzio admitted that she never concerned herself with whether 
or not Petitioner had enough money to meet the basic needs of R.A.F., 
her grandson. Mrs. Fazzio suggested this was because she felt it was 
'a matter between Kim and Cameron....(A)nd I did not know he was not 
providing for her. I had no need to do (sic know) that.' Despite this 
testimony, on at least two different occasions during Petitioner's 
attorney's cross-examination of her, Mrs. Fazzio admitted that she knew 
Respondent was not paying child support to Petitioner, making her 
testimony less credible; 
n. Further testimony showing the unreliability and unbelievability of 
the testimony of the paternal grandparents came during 
cross-examination involving court-ordered visitation commenced in June 
of 1990, after the instant actions were filed. Mrs. Fazzio admitted 
that she was aware that visitation with R.A.F. was to be at her 
residence by court order. Upon cross-examination, she admitted that on 
one occasion she and her husband left Salt Lake City with a boat 
attached to their truck, but dropped off the boat prior to picking up 
R.A.F. at Petitioner's residence. She admitted that after picking up 
R.A.F., she and her husband went back and picked up the boat and went 
boating on Echo Reservoir with R.A.F., Mrs. Fazzio stated that her boat 
was her home and so she didn't feel that she and her husband were 
violating Commissioner Peuler's (and Judge Wilkinson's) Order that 
visitation be at their residence. She indicated that '• • • summer 
weekends, our boat is our home. • • It's an overnight boat, it has 
cooking and sleeping facilities, and we live in it weekends.' However, 
when Mrs. Fazzio was asked how many weekends they had slept overnight 
on the boat that year, 1990, through August 17 (the day of the trial), 
she admitted that they had not slept on the boat once that year); 
o. Richard Bruce Fazzio, the paternal grandfather, agreed with his 
wife that his boat was his personal residence and their exercising 
visitation in June of 1990, by taking the child boating rather than to 
their home in Salt Lake City was not a violation of the District 
Court's Order. Such testimony shows the incredulity and 
unbelievability of the paternal grandparents, Steffany Fazzio and 
Richard Bruce Fazzio; 
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p. Petitioner gave Respondent's parents a note in October of 1989, 
indicating that she was going on vacation and she would allow them to 
see the child later. It was immediately after receiving this note at a 
time of expected visitation, that Mr. and Mrs. Fazzio retained an 
attorney and filed the Petition for Modification on behalf of their 
son, the Respondent. The Court believes that the instant action was 
filed only as a response to Responsent's parents' concern about their 
own visitation with the child, and not their son's; 
q. R.A.F. believes his dad is Petitioner's present husband, Mark 
Woodward (T. 83). He simply did not know who his biological father was 
as a result of his biological father's failure to make any serious 
efforts to visit with him; 
r. Petitioner allowed court-ordered visitation when requested between 
March of 1990 and the time of trial in this matter (August 1990), 
although there were only three occasions when Respondent took advantage 
of the opportunity to visit the child during this period of time. 
After one of these visitations, R.A.F. exclaimed to Petitioner 'Mom, 
Cameron told me he's my dad. He's not my dad.' On another occasion 
after a court-ordered visitation, R.A.F. was asked by Petitioner who 
Cameron (Respondent) was, and he would say that he was Brian's brother; 
and when asked by Petitioner who his dad was, he would always say 
•Mark' (R.A.F.'s stepfather); 
s. Witnesses Barbara Kresser and Ken Kresser, the parents of R.A.F.'s 
stepfather, Mark Woodward, testified that R.A.F. has never mentioned 
Respondent or anything about his natural father, and that contrary to 
the claims of the Respondent, R.A.F. has not been taught anything by 
the family with regard to who his father is, that it is just a natural 
relationship and a happy family; 
t. The Court finds that rather than Petitioner's movements from 
different residences being the cause of Respondent's failure to visit 
with the child, Respondent failed to have contact with the child to 
avoid paying child support. On one occasion, Christy Tinnin, 
Petitioner's sister, testified she accidentally ran into Respondent at 
a truck stop in February of 1989, at a time when she was aware 
Petitioner was looking for him to get him to pay child support. 
Respondent said to Ms. Tinnin during that conversation '. . . do me a 
favor and don't tell Kim you saw me, because I am supposed to be in 
Nevada.•; 
u. Even though Respondent was provided with court-ordered visitation 
after the filing of the instant lawsuit, he did not make an effort to 
spend much time with the child during the court-ordered visitations. 
Ken Kresser, the husband of Barbara Kresser and step-father of Mark 
Woodward and Petitioner's present husband, testified that after the May 
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1990, court-ordered visitation with Respondent, he asked R.A.F. about 
the visitation. R.A.F. replied that he had gone to the park. When Mr. 
Kresser asked him if Cameron (Respondent) was there with him, R.A.F. 
stated 'no, he was sleeping.'; 
Paragraph 8. During the period of the parties1 separation, and since 
the date of the Decree of Annulment (November 19, 1987), Respondent has paid 
no child support to Petitioner or anyone else on behalf of the minor child, 
Richard Anthony Fazzio. 
a. The testimony was clear at the trial that Respondent owed to 
Petitioner some $3,000.00 in back child support at the time of trial in 
this matter; 
b. Petitioner made significant efforts to contact Respondent to get 
him to pay child support and was regularly informed by Respondent's 
parents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, that they did not know how to 
contact Respondent and could not give her an address or telephone 
number for him. This Court finds it unbelievable that Mr. and Mrs. 
Fazzio never knew where their son was so as to allow Petitioner to 
contact him for purposes of obtaining her court-ordered child support; 
c. Only after Petitioner filed her Petition for Termination of 
Parental Rights did she receive any checks from anyone regarding child 
support. She did receive certain checks from the grandparents, Richard 
and Steffany Fazzio, at that time, supposedly on behalf of Respondent, 
but her attorney advised her to return those checks. The evidence is 
^incontroverted that no monies were ever submitted to Petitioner on a 
checking account with Respondent's on a checking account with 
Respondent's name on it. Nor was there any evidence that Respondent 
had provided any money to Petitioner; 
d. Respondent's testimony regarding efforts to pay child support was 
inherently unbelievable, untrustworthy and unreliable. Examples from 
the record are follows: 
1. Respondent claimed to have provided a car worth $600.00 to 
Petitioner in lieu of two months child support. However, 
rebuttal witness Scott Ortar testified that in fact Respondent 
sold the car in question to Sommers Auto Wrecking approximately 
three months after the parties' marriage was annulled for 
$75.00. Respondent admitted on cross-examination that he indeed 
sold the very same vehicle he claimed to have given Petitioner in 
lieu of child support to Sommers Auto Wrecking for $75.00, and 
further admitted that he did not give the $75.00 to Petitioner; 
2. Related to, but in addition to the foregoing regarding the 
car, Respondent testified on direct examination he did not give 
Petitioner title to the 1979 Mercury he was providing her in lieu 
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of child support after the annulment, because he did not have the 
title. Despite this testimony by Respondent, Petitioner 
introduced at trial Exhibit 7 which is a Utah Certificate of 
Title to the 1979 Mercury in question and related documents. 
This exhibit showed that the Utah Certificate of Title was issued 
in the name of Respondent, and was never in the name of 
Petitioner. Furthermore, this exhibit showed that Respondent 
signed the document as "transferor" before a notary public on 
February 5, 1988. This was the very date of the check introduced 
as Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 made out to Respondent from Sommers Auto 
Wrecking. Moreover, the VIN number of the vehicle on the 
Certificate of Title and the check made out to Richard D. Fazzio 
from Sommers Auto Wrecking are exactly the same, and clearly 
establish that this was the same vehicle Respondent claimed to 
have given Petitioner in lieu of child support. When confronted 
with the title to the car and the check from Sommers wrecking on 
cross-examination by Petitioner's attorney, Respondent testified 
he wished to change his testimony about not having the title to 
the vehicle and giving it to Petitioner in lieu of child support; 
3. Pursuant to the Decree of Annulment issued by the Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson in Civil No D-87-3798 on November 19, 1987, 
Petitioner alone was entitled to claim R.A.F. as a dependent on 
her income tax return; 
4. Although Respondent had stated on cross-examination that he 
had always been truthful with government agencies, Petitioner's 
attorney on cross-examination showed Respondent Exhibit 8 which 
is Respondent's 1987 Tax Return. Petitioner's attorney asked 
Respondent if everything reported on his 1987 Tax return was 
true, and Respondent replied it was. Yet he claimed R.A.F. as a 
deduction in violation of the Decree of Annulment despite his 
failure to pay child support; 
5. On cross-examination, Respondent was shown Petitioner's 
Exhibit 9 which was Respondent's 1988 Income Tax Return. 
Respondent admitted he paid no child support for 1988, but that 
the tax return showed that he was claiming R.A.F. as a dependent 
stating to the IRS that R.A.F. had lived in Respondent's home six 
months during 1988. Respondent admitted that that was not true 
and that he had apparently made a mistake in believing that his 
son, R.A.F., had lived in his home for six months in 1988 when he 
was living in Wyoming, Nevada and with his grandmother in Salt 
Lake City; 
6. The false statements made to the federal government on the 
income tax return claiming R.A.F. as a dependent under 
circumstances where he did not pay child support made 
Respondent's testimony incredible and unbelievable. 
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Paragraph 10. Subsequent to the birth of said child. Respondent had 
the opportunity to legally declare his paternity for the minor child, but he 
failed to do so in order to prevent the State of Utah or other persons or 
agencies from requiring him to meet his financial obligations as a parent. 
a. Darren Holt, Petitioner's husband from a prior marriage, and the 
father of Petitioner's child Darren Christopher Holt, received notice 
in approximately December of 1986 from the Department of Recovery 
Services stating he was responsible for child support for R.A.F.. Mr. 
Holt 
testified that he approched Respondent numerous times regarding this 
situation and asked him to submit to tests or sign a legal document 
admitting to the paternity of R.A.F. Respondent steadfastly refused to 
ever sign a document with the Department of Recovery Services 
acknowledging his paternity of R.A.F.. Mr. Holt contacted Respondent 
some 14 or 15 times attempting to get him to admit to his paternity of 
R.A.F. with the State and Respondent consistently refused; 
b. Although Respondent claimed he had signed a document upon the birth 
of R.A*F* acknowledging paternity. Respondent was unable to provide a 
copy of any document, or even an identification of a document he had 
signed acknowledging paternity when challenged to do so at trial by 
Petitioner's counsel. The result of Respondent's failure to 
acknowledge the paternity of R.A.F. to the State of Utah was that 
Darren Holt paid child support to the State of Utah's Department of 
Recovery Services on behalf of R.A.F., an obligation that was 
rightfully that of the Respondent. 
Paragraph 11. Although neither dispositive nor controlling in this 
case, there is evidence that during the period of time that Petitioner and 
Respondent lived together, Respondent was abusive, physically and emotionally 
to Petitioner, to Petitioner's minor child from a former marriage, and was 
emotionally abusive to the minor child, Richard Anthony Fazzio, who is the 
subject of this action. 
a. Petitioner had a child from a previous marriage, Darren Christopher 
Holt (DOB: 2/13/83), who lived with Petitioner at the time she was 
married to Respondent. Christopher was approximately four years old 
during that period; 
b. During the course of the marriage, Petitioner and her children, 
including R.A.F., were regularly subjected to mental and physical 
threats and abuse by Respondent; 
c. Respondent admitted during the course of the marriage that he 
"smacked Kim" and that he did not make sure that either R.A.F. or the 
child Christopher were out of the room when he slapped her; 
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d* Petitioner talked Respondent into seeking marriage counseling 
during the marriage; but not only did his abuse of her not change, 
Respondent actually beat her the day of counseling because he didn't 
like the things she said to the counselor; 
e. Darren Holt testified that his son, Christopher, told him during 
his visitations that he was terrified of Respondent, and that 
Respondent had threatened him (Christopher) with a knife and hit him a 
number of times. Mr. Holt also testified Christopher told him 
Respondent at one point drove Petitioner and Christopher out of 
Petitioner's home with a gun and told them that if they came back, he 
(Respondent) would kill them. This testimony was corroborated by 
Petitioner; 
f. When Mr. Holt confronted Respondent about this abuse of his son, 
Christopher, Respondent replied". . . While Christopher is in my house, 
I will treat him the way I want.M this testimony was corroborated by 
Petitioner who described respondent's attitude toward Christopher as 
"mean and hateful . . . cruel. . .; 
g. On one occasion. Respondent grabbed Petitioner by the hair and had 
her on the floor and was beating her head into the floor when she 
started calling for Christopher to run over to the neighbors and have 
them call the police. Petitioner testified that as Christopher moved. 
Respondent said M(I)if anybody moves off that couch, I'll kill her." 
R.A.F. was one of the two children present on the couch observing this 
physical abuse to his mother and the threat to kill her. Both R.A.F. 
and Christopher were terrified and they were taken by the police to the 
YWCA after this incident. 
Dated this 15th day of June, 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
tJohans sok, Judge 
cc: ^ rfr. Larry R. Keller, Esq. 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
<Jtix. John Walsh, Esq. 
3865 South Wasatch Blvd. 
Suite 202 - Cove Point Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
t^Jtah Court of Appeals 
No. 900626CA 
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STANFORD NIELSON 
LES F. ENGLAND (Bar No. 3646) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 278*5311 
FILMED 
2 DEFENDANT'S 
KBIT 
V 
EXHI I 
/ 3 l i fH'bb 
—ooOoo— 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE 
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
_JXUN H'M'i tr CLERK 
VOOIVf) COURT 
DEPUTY CLERK 
DARREN S. HOLT 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KIMBERLY FAYE HOLT 
Defendants, 
AFFIDAVIT OF KIMBERLY FAYE 
HOLT 
Civil No. D85-3447 
Judge Banks 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Kimberly Faye Holt, and being first 
duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. That she is the defendant in the above-entitled matter, 
the natural mother of the minor child of this marriage, DARREN 
CHRISTOPHER HOLT, born February 13, 1984. 
2. That the parties seperated on approximately May 20, 
1985 and at that time agreed to a temporary joint custody arrang-
ement of the minor child, Darren Holt. 
3. That from May 1985 through November 1985 the parties did 
share custody of the minor child, but that during the first 
part of December, 1985 plaintiff refused and has continued to 
relinquish custody of the minor child to defendant. 
4. That defendant is the natural mother of the minor child 
and a fit afld proper person to whom care custody and control of 
5. That plaintiff has attempted suicide in the^Tast and 
defendant fears for the minor childs well-being, and further 
believes that plaintiff is not a fit parent to care for said chil 
6- That plaintiff should be ordered to pay child support in 
the sum of $100.00 per month on a temporary basis until final 
determination of the court for permanent support and custody. 
'1 That because of plaintiff's refusal to return the 
minor child, Darren, to defendant's custody, all future visit-
ation should be on a restricted and supervised basis. 
8. All allegations contained in plaintiff's affidavit 
regarding defendant's boyfriend's alleged threats to the minor 
child are false, and in complete error. Defendant's boyfriend, 
has a strong and supportive relationship with the minor child. 
DATED this^/7 day of January, 1986. 
'74<Csrri/r{/L 
KIMBERLY FAYE 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this ^ 2 day o f January, 
1986. 
My Commission expires: 
/H-SJ 
Salt Lak 
c, residing in 
ty, Utah 
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dant claims he should have been convicted 
and, thus, sentenced for arson rather than 
aggravated arson, as both offenses pro-
scribe the conduct for which he was con-
victed. Therefore, we find defendant's jus-
tification for our reaching his Shondel ar-
gument, raised for the first time on appeal, 
without merit Defendant's Shondel claim 
presents neither "plain error" nor "excep-
tional circumstances" and, therefore, we 
refuse to consider it for the first time on 
appeal. See Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 926. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, because defendant failed to mar-
shal the evidence supporting his jury con-
viction for aggravated arson, we refuse to 
consider his claim of insufficient evidence. 
Furthermore, we decline to entertain the 
merits of defendant's Shondel claim, as he 
raises it for the first time on appeal. We, 
therefore, affirm his conviction for aggra-
vated arson. 
BENCH, P.J., and GARFF, J., concur. 
Kim <Fazzio) WOODWARD, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Richard Cameron FAZZIO, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 900626-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dec. 9, 1991. 
Father's parental rights were terminat-
ed by order of the Third District Juvenile 
"because of the clear error in the original sen-
tences." State v. Babbel, 770 P.2d 987, 994 
(Utah 1989). In the later Babbel case, the defen-
dant challenged the remand sentence which was 
harsher than his original sentence. 
The later Babbel case distinguished the "cor-
rection of an illegal sentence [which] stands on 
Court, Summit County, Olaf A. Johansson, 
J., and father appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Orme, J., held that (1) trial court's 
findings of fact were inadequate, and (2) 
affirmance as a matter of law was preclud-
ed, thus requiring remand, in light of dis-
puted evidence in the record. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Infants <s=>180 
"Prima facie" showing of abandon-
ment as set forth in statute concerning 
termination of parental rights may be es-
tablished only for custodial parent, but 
abandonment by noncustodial parent may 
also be established by clear and convincing 
evidence that parent's conduct evidenced a 
conscious disregard for his or her parental 
obligations to the child, and that the dis-
regard led to destruction of the parent-
child relationship. U.C.A.1953, 78-3a-48. 
2. Parent and Child <s=>2(8) 
There is strong presumption that child 
is better off in the care of its natural 
parents, or at least having some relation-
ship with its natural parents, and absent 
clear and convincing evidence that parent's 
disregard for his or her obligations caused 
destruction of parent-child relationship, 
presumption against termination of paren-
tal rights will govern. 
3. Trial <s=*395(5) 
Findings of fact must embody suffi-
cient detail and include enough subsidiary 
facts to clearly show the evidence on which 
they are grounded. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
52(a). 
4. Appeal and Error <3»1008.1(1) 
Court of Appeals will grant deference 
to fact finder only when findings of fact 
are sufficiently detailed to disclose the evi-
a different footing from the correction of an 
error in a conviction." Babbel, 813 P.2d at 88. 
This distinction pertains to this case because 
defendant contends not that his sentence is il-
legal but that his conviction was erroneous. 
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dentiary basis for the court's decision. OPINION 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 52(a). 
ORME, Judge: 
5. Appeal and Error <3»757(3) 
Appellant need not go through the fu- Appellant appeals the juvenile court's 
tile exercise of marshalling evidence when d e r terminating his parental rights in 
findings are so inadequate that they cannot s on-
 f Appellant challenges the juve 
be meaningfully challenged as factual de- court's findings of fact insofar as t 
terminations; appellant can simply argue purportedly support a determination 
the legal insufficiency of the findings as abandonment. We reverse and remand 
framed. more detailed findings. 
6. Infants e=»210 
Trial court's findings of fact in support 
of termination of noncustodial father's pa-
rental rights were inadequate, though con-
stituting three pages of text, where most 
of the "findings" were conclusory and 
more akin to conclusions of law, and pro-
vided no insight into the evidentiary basis 
for the trial court's decision. Rules Civ. 
Proc, Rule 52(a). 
7. Appeal and Error <s=>1106(5) 
Unless record clearly and uncontro-
vertedly supports trial court's decision, ab-
sence of adequate findings of fact ordinari-
ly requires remand for more detailed find-
ings by the trial court. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 52(a). 
8. Infants e=»254 
Affirmance of noncustodial father's 
parental rights as a matter of law was 
impossible, thus requiring remand where 
findings of fact were inadequate, where 
there was conflicting testimony about mat-
ters such as frequency and duration of 
father's visits with the child, his treatment 
of the child during those visits, and custodi-
al mother's attempts to prevent father 
from visiting with the child. 
John Walsh, Salt Lake City, for appel-
lant. 
Larry R. Keller, Salt Lake City, for ap-
pellee. 
Before JACKSON, ORME, and 
RUSSON, JJ. 
1. Such a provision is not terribly helpful to 
parties, like these, whose breakup is accompa-
nied by considerable rancor. 
FACTS 
Appellee Kim Woodward and appelli 
Richard Cameron Fazzio met in 1985 a 
began living together in August of tl 
year. In September of 1986, Woodws 
gave birth to the parties' son. Thi 
months later, Woodward and Fazzio part 
pated in a marriage ceremony. Howev 
at the time of the ceremony Woodward w 
already married to another man. As 
result, when the union between Woodwa 
and Fazzio was terminated, annulment w 
the method employed. The decree of a 
nulment gave Woodward custody of tl 
child, subject to reasonable visitation 1 
Fazzio "as the parties can agree." * Aft 
approximately two years under this a 
rangement, during which time Fazz 
claims Woodward repeatedly attempted i 
prevent him from contacting the child, Fa 
zio petitioned the district court to amer 
the decree to provide for specific visitatioi 
Woodward responded with a petition to te 
minate Fazzio's parental rights and a m< 
tion to transfer the same to juvenile cour 
The transfer was granted, and the petitio 
was heard by the juvenile court in Augus 
of 1990. The court granted Woodward' 
petition, ruling Fazzio's conduct constitute 
abandonment of the child. This determina 
tion was accepted by the district court 
On appeal, Fazzio challenges the correct 
ness of four of the juvenile court's finding 
of fact.2 Those findings, in pertinent part 
provide: 
2. Fazzio sets forth three additional issues oi 
appeal. These arguments are wholly withou 
merit and we decline to address them. See, e.g. 
State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 896 (Utah 1989) 
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(#7) Petitioner and Respondent sepa-
rated for the last time on September 10, 
1987, and Respondent has failed to make 
a serious effort to see the minor child, 
since that time. 
It is evident to the court that the natu-
ral father has abdicated his responsibility 
as a parent to said child. He has absent-
ed himself, for various and sundry rea-
sons, from the Child's life. 
His contacts with the child have been 
inconsistent, sporadic and token 
[T]he father's contact with the child has 
been minimal and only when his parents, 
Mr. and Mrs. Richard Fazzio, the pater-
nal grandparents, had the child. 
The father testified to frequent con-
tacts and visits with the child, usually 
when in the care of the paternal grand-
parents, but, on more than one occasion, 
the father's testimony was directly im-
peached rendering his testimony less reli-
able and trustworthy. Indeed, there is 
credible and believable testimony that 
the child does not know Richard Camer-
on Fazzio as his father. 
The court is convinced that the father's 
conduct has led to the destruction of the 
parent/child relationship. 
(# 8) During the period of the parties' 
separation, and since the date of the De-
cree of Annulment (November 19, 1987) 
Respondent has paid no child support to 
Petitioner or anyone else on behalf of the 
minor child. 
(# 10) Subsequent to the birth of the 
said child, Respondent had the opportuni-
ty to legally declare his paternity for the 
minor child, but he failed to do so in 
order to prevent the State of Utah or 
other persons or agencies from requiring 
him to meet his financial obligations as a 
parent. 
3. Under the statute, termination is permitted by 
a clear and convincing showing of: (1) parental 
unfitness or incompetence; (2) abandonment of 
the child; (3) refusal or failure to properly care 
for the child during an at-home trial period; or 
(# 11) [Respondent] . . . was emotion-
ally abusive to the minor child, who is 
the subject of this action. 
LAW GOVERNING TERMINATION 
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-48 (1987) pro-
vides the mechanism by which termination 
of parental rights may be effected. Since, 
in the instant case, the termination is based 
solely on abandonment, we begin our 
analysis by identifying the elements neces-
sary to establish that condition.3 The stat-
utory abandonment provision reads as fol-
lows: 
(1) The court may decree a termination 
of all parental rights with respect to one 
or both parents if the court finds either 
(a), (b), (c), or (d) as follows: 
(b) that the parent or parents have aban-
doned the child. It is prima facie evi-
dence of abandonment that the parent or 
parents, although having legal custody 
of the child, have surrendered physical 
custody of the child, and for a period of 
six months following the surrender have 
not manifested to the child or to the 
person having the physical custody of 
the child a firm intention to resume phys-
ical custody or to make arrangements for 
the care of the child; 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-48 (1987). 
[1,2] Only for a custodial parent may a 
"prima facie" showing of abandonment be 
established as set forth in subsection (b). 
State ex rel T.E. v. S.R, 761 P.2d 956, 958 
(Utah App.1988). But abandonment by a 
non-custodial parent like Fazzio, as well as 
a custodial parent, "may also be found 
where conduct on the part of the parent 
'implies a conscious disregard of the obli-
gations owed by a parent to the child, lead-
ing to the destruction of the parent-child 
relationship/ " Id. (quoting State ex rel. 
(4) failure to communicate with the child for a 
penod of one year, without just cause. See 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769, 102 S.Ct. 
1388, 1403, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), In re K.S., 
737 P.2d 170, 172 (Utah 1987). 
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Summers Children v. Wulffenstein, 560 
p.2d 331, 334 (Utah 1977)). See State ex 
rel J.R.T. v. Timperly, 750 P.2d 1234,1236 
(Utah App.1988). The Wulffenstein test 
for determining abandonment in termi-
nation proceedings requires proof of two 
elements. First, the party seeking termi-
nation must prove that "the parent's con-
duct evidenced a conscious disregard for 
his or her parental obligations" to the child. 
Timperly, 750 P.2d at 1236. Second, the 
party must demonstrate that the "dis-
regard led to the destruction of the parent-
child relationship."4 Id.; Wulffenstein, 
560 P.2d at 334. Both of these elements 
must be proven by clear and convincing 
evidence. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 
U.S. 745, 769, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1403, 71 
L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); In re J. Children, 664 
P.2d 1158, 1159 (Utah 1983). 
FINDINGS GENERALLY 
[3] Rule 52(a), Utah R.Civ.P., provides 
that "[i]n all actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the 
court shall find the facts specially and state 
separately its conclusions of law there-
o n — " s Utah appellate courts "consist-
ently stress" the importance of adequate 
"findings of fact." State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 
1296, 1300 (Utah App.1991). To succeed in 
challenging the findings, appellant must 
prove they are clearly erroneous, i.e., 
against the clear weight of the evidence. 
State ex rel J.R.T. v. Timperly, 750 P.2d 
1234, 1236 (Utah App.1988). Therefore, if 
we are to determine whether the evidence 
adduced at trial supports the trial court's 
findings, the findings must embody suffi-
cient detail and include enough subsidiary 
facts to clearly show the evidence upon 
which they are grounded. See Acton v. 
Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987); 
Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 957 (Utah 
4. Concern for the child's best interest is mani-
fested in the second prong of the Wulffenstein 
abandonment test: there is a strong presump-
tion that a child is better off in the care of its 
natural parents, or at least having some rela-
tionship with its natural parents, and absent 
clear and convincing evidence that the parent's 
disregard for his or her obligations caused a 
destruction of the parent-child relationship, the 
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1983); Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 
1338 (Utah 1979). Absent adequate find-
ings of fact, meaningful review of a deci-
sion's evidentiary basis is virtually impossi-
ble. See State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 
771 (Utah App.1990). 
Pazzio, in his brief and at oral argument, 
characterized his appeal as a challenge to 
the trial court's factual findings. Accord-
ingly, he attempted to marshal the evi-
dence, as is required for such a challenge. 
See In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885, 
886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker, 
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). However, 
the marshaling effort was largely ineffec-
tual by reason of the conclusory nature of 
the trial court's findings of fact 
[4,5] "The process of marshaling the 
evidence serves the important function of 
reminding litigants and appellate courts of 
the broad deference owed to the fact finder 
at trial." State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732,739 
(Utah App.1990). However, we will only 
grant this deference when the findings of 
fact are sufficiently detailed to disclose the 
evidentiary basis for the court's decision. 
See Lovegren, 798 P.2d at 771 (trial court 
decision afforded no deference when find-
ings inadequate). See also Allred v. 
Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App. 
1990) (failure to enter detailed findings con-
cerning child support determination consti-
tutes abuse of trial court's discretion). 
There is, in effect, no need for an appellant 
to marshal the evidence when the findings 
are so inadequate that they cannot be 
meaningfully challenged as factual deter-
minations. In other words, the way to 
attack findings which appear to be com-
plete and which are sufficiently detailed is 
to marshal the supporting evidence and 
then demonstrate the evidence is inade-
quate to sustain such findings. But where 
the findings are not of that caliber, appel-
presumption against termination will govern. 
See In re IP., 648 P.2d 1364, 1377 (Utah 1982); 
In re Castillo, 632 P.2d 855, 856-57 (Utah 1981); 
State ex rel M.W.H. v. Aguitar, 794 P.2d 27, 29 
(Utah App.1990). 
5. The rule is applicable to juvenile proceedings. 
See In re N.H.B., 111 P.2d 487, 493 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989). 
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lant need not go through a futile marshal-
ing exercise. Rather, appellant can simply 
argue the legal insufficiency of the court's 
findings as framed. As explained in the 
next section, whatever may be said of the 
extent to which the trial court's intended 
findings lack evidentiary support, the more 
immediate problem in this case is the inade-
quacy of the findings. 
INADEQUACY OF TRIAL COURTS 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
[6] Although the trial court's findings 
of fact constitute a full three pages of text, 
they nonetheless provide an inadequate ac-
count of the actual facts supporting the 
court's ultimate decision. Most of the 
"findings" are conclusory, and reflect an 
intention to merge the trial court's ultimate 
factual determinations with the require-
ments of the Wulffenstein test, and as 
such are more akin to conclusions of law. 
See Vigil, 815 P.2d at 1299-1301. Finding 
of Fact # 7, for instance, states that "[ap-
pellant's] contacts with the child have been 
inconsistent, sporadic and token," that "it 
is evident to the court that the natural 
Father has abdicated his responsibility as a 
parent," and that "the court is convinced 
that the father's conduct has led to the 
destruction of the parent/child relation-
ship." These conclusory statements pro-
vide no insight into the evidentiary basis 
for the trial court's decision and render 
effective appellate review unfeasible.6 See 
Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1, 5-6 
(Utah Ct.App.1991). The issue before the 
court was whether Fazzio had abandoned 
R.A.F.; accordingly, the findings should 
have set forth specific /acts—subsidiary 
facts—bearing on that issue. The conclu-
sory statements in Findings of Fact # 7, 8, 
6. Taking, for example, the court's statement that 
appellant's contacts with the child have been 
"token," the court obviously had in mind some 
number or range of contacts appellant had with 
the child. But such a finding is problematic. 
Does the court have in mind one contact over a 
three-year period or ten contacts over a one-
year period? A reviewing court would possibly 
agree that the former is "token," but disagree 
that the latter is. However, without knowing 
what the trial court had in mind, to affirm 
10, and 11 do not provide this information 
and are therefore inadequate. 
[7] Unless the record "clearly and un-
controvertedly supports]" the trial court's 
decision, the absence of adequate findings 
of fact ordinarily requires remand for more 
detailed findings by the trial court7 Ac-
ton, 737 P.2d at 999. See also Lovegren, 
798 P.2d at 770-71 (remand necessary 
when facts disputed). But see State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787-88 & n. 6 (Utah 
1991) (suggesting same liberalization of Ac-
ton's requirement of express findings even 
absent uncontroverted evidence). 
[8] We have canvassed the record in 
the instant case and find disputed evidence, 
making affirmance as a matter of law im-
possible. Cf Lovegren, 798 P.2d at 771 n. 
10 (absence of adequate findings is harm-
less when facts eoraermftg an issue axe 
undisputed). There was conflicting testi-
mony about the frequency and duration of 
Fazzio's visits with the child, his treatment 
of the child during those visits, Wood-
ward's attempts to prevent Fazzio from 
visiting with the child, Fazzio's payment of 
child support, and Fazzio's provision of 
gifts to the chUd—all facts crucial to the 
validity of the court's ultimate decision that 
Fazzio's conduct had destroyed the parent-
child relationship. See Adams, 821 P.2d at 
6 ("When multiple conflicting versions of 
the facts create a matrix of possible factual 
findings, we are unable on appeal to as-
sume that any given finding was in fact 
made."). 
The trial court's findings of fact should 
resolve these conflicts unequivocally, by 
stating the specific subsidiary facts as the 
trial court found them. The findings 
should set forth, with as much precision as 
possible, the number of times Fazzio visited 
the child during particular periods; the 
would be to defer to the court's legal conclusion, 
as though a matter of fact, without being able to 
evaluate its correctness against particular facts. 
7. Otherwise, this court would be placed in the 
awkward position of having to speculate about 
what the court actually determined the facts to 
be, without benefit of the guidance that proper 
factual findings are meant to provide. 
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length of each of the visits; the number of 
visits Woodward intentionally prevented; 
the sums Pazzio provided as child support, 
either personally or through his parents; 
the number and type of gifts Fazzio gave 
to the child and the occasions on which he 
gave them; and the specific statements, 
acts, or omissions that demonstrate Faz-
zio's intent to either accept or disregard his 
obligations as a parent (e.g., instances of 
appellant performing child care functions 
like changing his diaper or feeding him, 
denying that the child was his responsibili-
ty, etc.). 
Further, the findings should explicitly 
address the impact Woodward's frequent 
relocation had on Fazzio's ability to main-
tain contact with the child,8 the effect Faz-
zio's living and working outside Utah had 
on his visitation,9 the manner and effect of 
any refusal on Fazzio's part to legally ac-
knowledge his paternity, and any other 
factors bearing on whether Fazzio con-
sciously disregarded the child to such an 
extent that the parent-child relationship 
was destroyed.10 The court's findings as to 
these issues should be set forth specifically 
and should correspond to the factual evi-
dence upon which the court relied. 
Once we possess this information, we can 
meaningfully evaluate whether the visits 
have been sporadic, the child support pay-
ments insufficient, Fazzio's conduct unac-
ceptable, and, ultimately, whether Fazzio 
abandoned the child. Accordingly, we re-
mand for more detailed findings by the 
trial court. 
"We do not intend our remand to be 
merely an exercise in bolstering and sup-
porting the conclusion already reached." 
Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 
1990). This court is not altogether confi-
dent that the trial court's final decision was 
8. The record indicates that from the time the 
decree of annulment was entered until trial, 
Woodward had moved in with her mother, then 
into her own apartment, then to Coalville, 
Springville, Riverton, West Jordan, and back to 
Coalville. 
9. The record indicates Fazzio was employed in 
Wyoming and Nevada for periods of time after 
the decree was entered and maintained resi-
dences in those states. 
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correct, particularly since the action to ter-
minate Fazzio's parental rights was com-
menced by Woodward in response to Faz-
zio's petition for specific visitation. The 
timely assertion of such a petition by Faz-
zio is hardly the conduct of a disinterested 
parent 
JACKSON, J., concurs. 
RUSSON, J., concurs in the result 
J*\ . 
( O I KEY NUMBER SYST£M> 
LeBARON & ASSOCIATES, 
INC., Plaintiff, 
v. 
REBEL ENTERPRISES, INC, 
Defendant, Third-Party 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
NEC INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 
INC., Third-Party Defendant 
and Appellee. 
No. 910120-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dec. 18, 1991. 
Manufacturer, by third-party counter-
claim, asserted contract action to recover 
from dealer money allegedly owed under 
authorized dealer agreement Judgment 
for manufacturer was entered by the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Kenneth 
Rigtrup, J., and dealer appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Billings, Associate PJ., 
* 
10. For example, the court seems to have dis-
counted visits Fazzio had with his son while the 
son was in the company of Fazzio's parents. 
Especially given the animosity between Wood-
ward and Fazzio, and Woodward's apparent 
preference for dealing with Fazzio's parents, no 
reason immediately suggests itself for why Faz-
zio's visits with the child during time the child 
spent with his paternal grandparents should not 
"count" in Fazzio's favor. 
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